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ARTICLES
INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE, CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT
AND DANGER IN THE DORMS: REGULATORY
LIMITS AND THE PROMISE OF TORT LAW
Professor Andrea A. Curcio*
In the winter of 1979, outside a fraternity house at a small liberal arts
elite college, the boys built a snow sculpture of a train1 with the number 5
displayed on it. The sculpture glorified the fact that 5 boys had raped a young
college woman. The train remained outside the fraternity house for weeks
while school administrators drove by the house on their way to and from
campus. No one questioned the boys.2
* Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. The author thanks Professors
Wendy Hensel, Eileen Kaufman, & Timothy Lytton, as well as Thomas Michael Hodell Jr., all of whom
provided insight and expertise that greatly assisted with the research and drafting of this paper. While
they may not agree with all the interpretations or conclusions of this paper, their help was deeply appre-
ciated. The author also thanks Billy Fawcett for his work as a graduate research assistant and the Geor-
gia State University College of Law librarians, in particular Pam Brannon, for their collective unending
patience and support with research requests. Finally, she thanks the University of Montana School of
Law for hosting this important symposium.
1. Julie K. Ehrhart & Bernice Sandler, Campus Gang Rape: Party Games?, ASS’N OF AM. COLLS.
PROJECT ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 2 (Nov. 1985), https://perma.cc/JTP6-GDSP (noting that fraternity
members often call gang rape “pulling a train” to symbolize “men lining up like train cars to take
turns”).
2. This story is based upon my own experience. I also had a roommate who was raped in a dorm
room her sophomore year of college. This all happened almost forty years ago. Unfortunately, the stories
of campus sexual violence, silence about that violence, and universities ignoring the problem are not
new. As for the snow sculpture, it is impossible to say whether university administrators knew what the
sculpture symbolized. I can only say that the gossip on campus about that sculpture was rampant and
widespread.
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I. INTRODUCTION3
For decades many institutes of higher education (IHEs) have purpose-
fully ignored the peer-on-peer sexual assaults occurring with alarming fre-
quency on their campuses4 and have discouraged victims from reporting or
pressing criminal charges against their alleged perpetrators.5 These institu-
tional failures have gotten significant attention recently.6 What has not re-
ceived much attention is the fact that most on-campus sexual assaults hap-
pen in college dorm rooms.7
Ignoring where most on-campus sexual assaults occur matters for nu-
merous reasons. First, while schools have begun addressing the issue of
campus sexual assault, many still are not being totally open about the prob-
lem. Data suggests that those most vulnerable to sexual assault are fresh-
men early in the first semester8 and that most victims know their assailant.9
On residential campuses, most freshmen live in dorms. Failure to alert these
students to where they are at greatest risk for an on-campus acquaintance
3. While sexual violence victims are not exclusively women, throughout this article, I use female
pronouns to refer to victims and male pronouns to refer to perpetrators because this reflects reality—
most victims are women and most perpetrators are men. See Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Burying Our Heads
in the Sand: Lack of Knowledge, Knowledge Avoidance, and the Persistent Problem of Campus Peer
Sexual Violence, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 205, 207 n.1 (2011). I also use the term sexual assault to describe
all forms of unwanted sexual activity, including rape. See CAROL BOHMER & ANDREA PARROT, SEXUAL
ASSAULT ON CAMPUS: THE PROBLEM AND THE SOLUTION 3 (1993) (noting that “[s]exual assault is a
general term that describes all forms of unwanted sexual activity”).
4. In October 1985, after a three-year survey of 7,000 students, Ms. Magazine published an article
that discussed how one in four college women reported being raped or subjected to attempted rape,
although most failed to identify what had happened as rape. See Ellen Sweet, Date Rape Revisited,
WOMEN’S MEDIA CENTER (Feb. 23, 2012), https://perma.cc/VT52-VT5H (discussing 1985 Ms. Maga-
zine article, “The Story of an Epidemic and Those Who Deny it”). The Ms. Magazine article was fol-
lowed by a published report in 1988 detailing the study’s findings. See ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER
CALLED IT RAPE: THE MS. REPORT ON RECOGNIZING, FIGHTING AND SURVIVING DATE AND ACQUAIN-
TANCE RAPE (1988). In the early 1990s, the national media engaged in widespread coverage about
acquaintance rapes on college campuses. See BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 3, at 1–3. Additionally, in R
1985, an extensive study about the problem of gang rape on college campuses was published by the
Association of American Colleges Project on the Status of Women. See Ehrhart & Sandler, supra note 1. R
That report outlined the extent of the problem and proposed model prevention programs—recommenda-
tions that likely were largely ignored by many schools.
5. Lauren P. Schroeder, Cracks in the Ivory Tower: How the Campus Sexual Violence Elimination
Act Can Protect Students from Sexual Assault, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 1195, 1216 (2014) (discussing
various cases in which universities discouraged reporting).
6. See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note 5, at 1218–24 (discussing widespread publicity surrounding R
how Notre Dame, Marquette and University of Colorado Boulder dealt with assault reports).
7. See infra Section II(B)(1) (compiling data regarding incidence of sexual violence by location).
8. Matthew Kimble et al., Risk of Unwanted Sex for College Women: Evidence for a Red Zone, 57
J. OF AM. COLL. HEALTH 331 (2008) (noting that the start of freshmen year has been thought to be such
high risk for incoming students that the start of the school year has become known as “the red zone” and
finding support for the existence of the “red zone”).
9. Bonnie S. Fisher et al., The Sexual Victimization of College Women, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 17
(Dec. 2000), https://perma.cc/F8W4-N2BW.
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sexual assault illustrates a long-standing, and ongoing, institutional failure
by many schools to deal forthrightly with a problem they know, or should
know, exists. Second, by focusing on threats external to the dorms, IHEs
provide students with a false sense of security once they arrive at the dorm,
therefore potentially contributing to dorm-based assault risks because po-
tential victims, and bystanders who might intervene, are not aware of the
risks in the dorm itself and thus may be unaware of the need to address
those risks.10 Third, ignoring where sexual assaults occur means that many
schools are not studying whether dorm-based interventions can reduce ac-
quaintance assault risks.11 Finally, the fact that this information has not
been widely disseminated raises questions about whether existing regula-
tory schemes can adequately motivate institutional behavioral changes in
light of many schools’ beliefs that their reputational and financial interests
are best served by presenting their campuses, and particularly their campus
housing, as bucolic and safe educational and living environments.12
Laws cannot solve the multi-dimensional campus and societal sexual
assault problem.13 However, regulations and litigation can influence institu-
tional behaviors. That is what current federal regulations hope to do. Ex-
isting federal regulations require IHEs to publicly disclose various types of
sexual violence occurring both on- and off-campus14 and to facilitate stu-
dent sexual violence reporting.15 More recently enacted regulations seek to
reduce sexual violence risks by mandating awareness and prevention educa-
tion.16
This essay suggests that for numerous reasons, existing regulations
face implementation roadblocks and are unlikely, standing alone, to moti-
vate many schools to meaningfully address the widespread acquaintance
sexual assault problem—especially assaults occurring in dorm rooms. How-
ever, litigation, and publicity arising from litigation, may be a powerful
10. See infra Section II(B)(3)(a) (discussing how schools may be misleading students into thinking
their dorms are a “safe space”).
11. See infra Section II(B)(3)(b) (discussing missed risk reduction opportunities).
12. See infra Section III(A)(2) (discussing actual and perceived financial and reputational disincen-
tives when it comes to disclosing the high percentage of campus rapes occurring in dorm rooms).
13. Sexual assault is a societal problem, not just one that occurs on college campuses. See generally
Matthew J. Breiding et al., Prevalence and Characteristics of Sexual Violence, Stalking and Intimate
Partner Violence Victimization-National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, United States,
2011, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Sept. 4, 2014), https://perma.cc/7T45-3RLJ
(discussing national sexual violence survey results).
14. See infra Section II(B)(1) (describing Clery Act requirements).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 106–108 and 119 (discussing Dear Colleague Letter and its
later codification).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 108–112 (describing Campus SaVE Act requirements).
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force in reforming schools’ dorm-based assault risk reduction efforts.17
That is what has happened with the campus assault reporting process.
Largely due to Title IX enforcement actions, civil litigation, and the result-
ing publicity, schools have begun to take seriously their responsibility to
facilitate the assault reporting process and to address campus sexual assault
more generally.18
This essay asks whether tort law negligence claims can fill a gap be-
tween existing regulations and Title IX actions when it comes to addressing
dorm-based acquaintance sexual assaults. It suggests that just as Title IX
suits are putting pressure on schools to improve how they handle sexual
assault reports, negligence claims based upon IHEs’ failure to engage in
meaningful dorm-based risk reduction efforts may focus attention on insti-
tutional failures that need to be addressed and consequently may result in
self-regulatory reform.
Part II of this essay provides a brief review of existing data that speaks
to the breadth of the campus sexual assault problem, particularly the data
indicating that the majority of on-campus rapes occur in college dorms. It
also briefly discusses why where sexual assaults occur matters. Part III
identifies existing regulations and how and why those regulations have not
fully achieved their goals of encouraging widespread meaningful sexual as-
sault risk reduction efforts, as well as why existing regulations do little to
eliminate the institutional silence about the “danger in the dorms.” Part IV
looks at whether tort law negligence claims can complement existing regu-
lations’ goal of motivating schools to explore and develop meaningful ac-
quaintance assault risk reduction mechanisms. Drawing from Professor
Timothy Lytton’s analysis of clergy sexual abuse cases,19 it examines negli-
gence claims’ potential to re-frame the issue of campus sexual assaults oc-
curring in dorms as part of a long-standing and on-going institutional fail-
ure. It discusses how that framing may lead to media attention, which may
in turn lead to increased public pressure and potentially greater IHE self-
17. This is what happened in clergy sexual abuse cases. See generally TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, HOLD-
ING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE: HOW LAWSUITS HELPED THE CATHOLIC CHURCH CONFRONT CLERGY SEX-
UAL ABUSE (2008).
18. Tovia Smith, How Campus Sexual Assaults Came to Command New Attention, KUOW (Aug.
12, 2014), https://perma.cc/9Z4T-MKWB (transcript of NPR interview with women’s advocates who
note that schools only began to pay attention to campus sexual assaults when they realized they faced
potentially serious consequences for violating Title IX if they failed to change their policies); Robin
Wilson, In Context: Why Colleges Are on the Hook for Sexual Assault, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC.,
Fall 2014, at 3 (noting that “[i]t wasn’t until 2011, experts say, when the Education Department’s Office
of Civil Rights released a ‘Dear Colleague’ letter, that campuses began taking their role more seri-
ously”).
19. Framing the issue as one of institutional failure, and discussing how that framing influences
behaviors, builds upon work done by Professor Timothy Lytton in context of clergy sexual abuse cases.
See LYTTON, supra note 17. R
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regulation. It also looks at how negligence claims, via discovery and inves-
tigation during those claims, can provide policymakers with information to
help inform future policy decisions. Part V examines barriers to using tort
law negligence claims to motivate institutional change. In particular, it
notes that before tort law can be a vehicle for change, courts must reformu-
late the conceptualization of schools’ duty of care. This section discusses
how, like in clergy sexual abuse cases, reframing the issue from one of “a
few bad men” to one of institutional failure can eventually shift public per-
ceptions and judicial attitudes when it comes to schools’ responsibilities to
take reasonable precautionary measures to protect their students (particu-
larly students living in dorms) from acquaintance sexual assaults. The sec-
tion goes on to suggest a framework to conceptualize schools’ duty to use
reasonable precautionary measures to protect students living in their dorms
as a special duty based on schools’ superior knowledge of risks and their
ability to regulate dorm life. Finally, this section also briefly reviews barri-
ers to tort litigation claims that may limit tort law’s ability to effectuate
immediate change.
At the outset, it is important to acknowledge that there is not a single
way schools approach campus sexual assaults. As early as 1993, Professors
Bohmer and Parrot noted that schools have dealt with campus sexual assault
along a continuum that runs from engaging in meaningful prevention efforts
and enforcing severe offender penalties to ignoring the problem or, in some
cases, blaming the victim.20 The proposals in this essay target the latter
schools but may also inform the former.
II. DATA AND DANGER IN THE DORMS
A. Campus Acquaintance Sexual Assaults: A Widespread
and Long-Standing Problem
Studies indicate an extremely high rate of sexual victimization among
college students.21 While sexual violence affects all students regardless of
gender,22 most sexual violence victims are women.23 Reports suggest ap-
20. BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 3, at 123–24 (noting the continuum of colleges’ behaviors R
when it comes to handling campus sexual assault in the 1990s). Victim blaming is not something of a
bygone era. See, e.g., Ana Carbrera & Sara Weisfeldt, Punished After Reporting Rape at Brigham Young
University, CNN (Apr. 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/QW58-TCRW (discussing how young women who
reported rapes at BYU were disciplined or treated with disbelief after reporting sexual assaults).
21. See David Cantor et al., Report on the AAU Campus Climate Survey on Sexual Assault and
Misconduct, ASS’N OF AM. UNIV. 26 (Sept. 21, 2015), https://perma.cc/UJZ4-B6WB (discussing studies
that indicate an extremely high rate of non-consensual sexual contact involving force or incapacitation
occurring on college campuses).
22. Id. at 24 (noting that 19% of TGQN, 17% of women and 4.4% of male students reported
experiencing some form of sexual assault).
5
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proximately one in four to five college women experience some form of
unwanted forcible or incapacitated sexual violence from the time they enter
school until graduation.24 For college women, the highest risk exists during
the first few months of their freshmen year.25 In fact, this vulnerability has
led the first few weeks of college attendance to be labeled the “red zone”
for college freshmen.26 Finally, data indicates that approximately 90% of
sexual assault victims know their assailant.27 Much of this data has been
part of the public discussion for decades.28 This essay discusses data that
has been largely ignored—data about where most on-campus assaults oc-
cur.
B. Danger in the Dorms
1. Clery Act Data Shows Most On-Campus Sexual Assaults Occur in
Campus Housing
The Clery Act29 requires schools to compile and report statistics on a
wide range of crimes occurring “on campus, in or on noncampus buildings
or property, and on public property.”30 The report must identify where the
crime occurred, and for crimes occurring on campus, schools must disclose
whether the crime occurred in campus residential housing.31 Under the
Clery Act, colleges and universities must disclose all reported crimes, re-
gardless of whether these reports led to investigations or disciplinary ac-
23. Cantalupo, supra note 3, at 210. R
24. Cantor et al., supra note 21, at 26 (reporting findings from two studies indicating anywhere R
between one in four and one in five college senior women report an incident of non-consensual sexual
contact involving force or incapacitation since entering college). But see L. Fedina et al., Campus Sexual
Assault: A Systematic Review of Prevalence Research from 2000–2015, TRAUMA VIOLENCE ABUSE
(Feb. 22, 2016) (advance online publication, doi:10.177/1524838016631129) (noting that the data needs
further refinement by type of sexual violence and finding significant variability in the forms of sexual
victimization on college campuses with unwanted sexual contact, including sexual coercion, as the most
prevalent form of sexual victimization on college campuses, followed by incapacitated rape and com-
pleted or attempted forcible rape).
25. Christopher Krebs et al., Campus Climate Survey Validation Study Final Technical Report,
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 75 (Jan. 2016), https://perma.cc/V7D4-BGXL (noting that the most vulnerable
students were freshmen, with the incidence of assault declining each year after the freshmen year).
26. Kimble et al., supra note 8. R
27. Fisher et al., supra note 9, at 17 (noting that for “completed and attempted rapes, about 7 in 10
offenders were known to their victims”).
28. BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 3, at 26 (noting, in their book published in 1993, that most R
sexual assaults occur between acquaintances, one in four college women will experience an attempted or
completed forced sexual encounter and that the sexual assaults happen most often during the women’s
first year in college).
29. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1092(f)(1)–(15) (West 2013).
30. Id. § 1092(f)(1)(F).
31. Id. § 1092(f)(4)(A)(i); Handbook for Campus Safety and Security, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUCATION 2-
9 (June 2016), https://perma.cc/B592-BKTQ [hereinafter Clery Act Handbook 2016].
6
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tions,32 and regardless of whether the crime victim filed a police report or
pressed charges.33 A crime is considered “reported” if it is brought to the
attention of a campus security authority.34
Until 2014, schools were required to report sexual offense crimes as
either forcible sexual offenses or non-forcible sexual offenses.35 In 2014,
sexual offense reporting categorization changed. Now, schools must report
sexual offenses as rapes36 and fondlings.37
The reported Clery Act data indicates that in 2014, 82% of all reported
on-campus rapes occurred in campus residence halls and that 71% of all
reported rapes occurred in campus residence halls.38 The majority of on-
campus fondlings also occurred in campus residence halls.39 [See Table 1.]
Similar statistics exist for 2005–2013.40 In those years, approximately
70% of all reported on-campus forcible sexual offenses occurred in resi-
dence halls and 54–60% of all reported forcible sexual offenses occurred in
campus residence halls. [See Table 2.]
32. Clery Act Handbook 2016, supra note 31, at 3-3. R
33. Id.
34. Campus security authorities encompass a wide range of faculty members, students, and admin-
istrators as well as more traditional security personnel. Clery Act Handbook 2016, supra note 31, at 4-1 R
to 4-5 (discussing who is a “campus security authority”).
35. Forcible offenses were defined as “any sexual act directed against another person, forcibly and/
or against that person’s will; or not forcibly or against the person’s will where the victim is incapable of
giving consent.” Non-forcible sex offenses were defined as “unlawful, non-forcible sexual intercourse.”
Clery Act Handbook 2016, supra note 31, at 3-6. R
36. Rape is defined as “the penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or anus, with any body
part or object, or oral penetration by a sex organ of another person, without the consent of the victim.”
Id.
37. Fondlings are defined as “the touching of the private body parts of another person for the
purpose of sexual gratification, without the consent of the victim, including instances where the victim is
incapable of giving consent because of his/her age or because of his/her temporary or permanent mental
incapacity.” Id.
38. Campus Safety and Security Data Analysis, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (2014), https://perma.cc/
HTW7-AN5Z (The data was compiled and analyzed using the online Campus Safety and Security Data
Analysis tool available through the Department of Education. At the time of publication, the most re-
cently available data was from 2014) [hereinafter USDE Data Analysis].
39. Id.
40. Id. (The data for Table 2 was compiled via a search using the online Campus Safety and Secur-
ity Data Analysis tool, and the search looked at a series of Excel spreadsheets that contained data for
forcible and non-forcible sexual offenses from 2005–2013).
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TABLE 1: 2014 CLERY ACT DATA WHICH REPORTS
RAPES AND FONDLINGS
Reported Rape
% of on-
Overall % in campus in
In Residence –residence residence
Year Total On Campus Halls halls halls
2014 5187 4464 3658 71% 82%
Reported Fondling
%of on-
Overall % in campus in
In Residence –residence residence
Year Total On Campus Halls halls% halls
2014 2709 2330 1236 46% 53%
TABLE 2 – 2005-2013 CLERY ACT REPORTS
Raw Numbers–Forcible Sexual Offenses41
Total Overall % % of on
Total Reported reported campus
Reported Occurring in occurring in reported in
Total Occurring Residence Residence Residence
Year Reported On Campus Halls Hall Hall
2005 3583 2704 1939 54% 72%
2006 3490 2710 1922 55% 71%
2007 3490 2698 1880 54% 70%
2008 3267 2666 1887 58% 71%
2009 3278 2604 1802 55% 69%
2010 3584 2932 2063 57% 70%
2011 4198 3425 2416 57% 71%
2012 4949 4075 2084 57% 70%
2013 6016 5052 3632 60% 72%
2. Other Data Also Indicates Most On-Campus Assaults Occur in
Dorms
The Clery Act data set forth above in Tables 1 and 2 provides signifi-
cant support for finding that the majority of on-campus sexual assaults oc-
cur in campus residence halls. However, under the Act, campus residential
housing includes all forms of on-campus student housing: dorms, married
41. This table does not include the data for non-forcible sexual offenses since the reported number
of non-forcible offenses averaged less than 60 per year across the relevant time period.
8
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student housing, and fraternity and sorority houses owned or controlled by
the university or located on university property.42 For reporting purposes,
the Act does not require schools to distinguish between Greek housing and
other on-campus residence halls.43 Thus, one might assume that the vast
majority of the reported assaults occur in fraternity or sorority housing be-
cause of the data linking Greek membership to increased risk of being in-
volved in a sexual assault.44 That assumption would likely be incorrect. A
study of campus sexual assaults occurring on Massachusetts’ college cam-
puses from 2001 to 2011 found that 81% occurred in dorms, 9% happened
in a house or apartment and only 4% occurred in a fraternity house.45 Other
data also suggests the majority of on-campus assaults occur in dorm rooms.
For example, a study by a higher education insurance company found that
53% of all claims against universities for campus sexual assaults involved
incidents occurring either in the victim’s or the perpetrator’s dorm room.46
The data set forth above relies upon reported incidents. However,
many acts of sexual violence are unreported.47 Where do those occur? A
2014–2015 study of 150,000 students across 27 campuses sought informa-
tion about unreported, as well as reported, incidences of sexual violence.48
That study found that for female undergraduate students, 56% of forcible
penetration incidents occurred on campus49 with the majority of the on-
campus incidents taking place in a university residence hall or dorm.50 This
study confirms earlier study findings that looked at both reported and unre-
ported incidents and concluded that “almost 60 percent of the completed
42. Clery Act Handbook 2016, supra note 31, at 2-2. R
43. Id. at 2-9 to 2-10.
44. Jacqueline C. Minow & Christopher J. Einolf, Sorority Participation and Sexual Assault Risk,
15 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 835, 844 (July 2009) (finding that sorority members were more likely to
have experienced campus sexual assault than non members); Sarah K. Murnen & Maria H. Kohlmen,
Athletic Participation, Fraternity Membership, and Sexual Aggression Among College Men: A Meta-
Analytic Review, 57 SEX ROLES 145, 153 (July 2007) (performing a meta-analysis of numerous studies
and concluding that athletes and fraternity members were more likely than non-athletes and non-frater-
nity members to hold attitudes of sexual aggression and, to a smaller extent, to self-report sexually
aggressive behavior).
45. Analysis of College Campus Rape and Sexual Assault Reports 2000–2011, MA OFFICE OF PUB-
LIC SAFETY AND SEC. 7 (2012), https://perma.cc/R42T-JC28.
46. Confronting Campus Sexual Assault: An Examination of Higher Education Claims, UNITED
EDUCATORS INS. 6 (2015), https://perma.cc/6Z25-ZNQP.
47. See infra Section III(A)(1) (discussing under-reporting problems).
48. Bonnie S. Fisher et al., Characteristics of Nonconsensual Sexual Contact Incidents: Penetration
or Sexual Touching by Force or While Incapacitated, WESTAT 1 (May 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/
SWY9-RN4V.
49. Id. at 46.
50. Id. The Fisher et al. study gets significantly more granular, dividing incidents between types of
assault (forcible penetration, forcible sexual touching, incapacitated forcible penetration and incapaci-
tated forcible sexual touching). It also divides responses based upon gender [including transgender] and
graduate versus undergraduate status. The data about assault location varies somewhat depending upon
gender, type of assault, and whether it involved graduate or undergraduate students. Id. at 43–57.
9
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rapes that occurred on campus took place in the victim’s residence, 31 per-
cent occurred in other living quarters on campus, and 10.3 percent took
place in a fraternity.”51
More data on exactly where campus sexual assaults occur would be
useful, and questions about assault location should be incorporated into fu-
ture studies and surveys.52 However, even without these studies, existing
data indicates that when it comes to on-campus sexual assaults, the vast
majority occur where on-campus students live (i.e., college dorm rooms).
3. Why Where Assaults Occur Matters
a. Current Prevention Efforts May Create a False Sense of
Security
Failing to inform students that the majority of on-campus rapes occur
in dorm rooms means students may not realize the need to engage in pre-
cautionary measures in the dorms—especially because most of the sexual
assault awareness and risk reduction education and training focuses on risks
external to the dorms. For example, to satisfy the statutory sexual violence
prevention and awareness education requirements,53 many colleges and uni-
versities require new students to complete an online training program54 and
also offer additional sexual assault awareness and risk reduction pro-
grams.55 However, it is likely that many of these programs fail to empha-
size that the highest risk area on campus is college dorm rooms.56 This is
true despite the fact that many schools require freshmen to live in on-cam-
51. Fisher et al., supra note 9, at 18. This study did find that overall, off-campus victimization was
more common than on-campus sexual victimization. Id. at 19.
52. Future studies should look at not just whether an assault occurred in a dorm, but also should
identify that dorm’s characteristics: was it a dorm that housed a particular cohort of students such as
international students, honor students, religious students, athletes, etc.; was it a single-sex or co-ed
dorm; if co-ed, was it co-ed by floor, room, or hall. This data could help better identify if any particular
type of dorm, or dorm configuration, presents higher risks of assault and would allow for better risk
reduction targeting.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 116–117 (discussing statutory requirements for awareness
and prevention education).
54. See Robin Wilson, Why Campuses Can’t Talk About Alcohol When It Comes to Sexual Assault,
THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. 9 (Sept. 4, 2014), https://perma.cc/T4NE-57HM (noting that many cam-
puses offer educational programs that are often online courses, that warn about the dangers of sexual
assault and how to prevent it). A wide range of online programs such as Haven, Campus Clarity, Unless
There is Consent, and Every Choice are available to colleges and universities.
55. See, e.g., Tovia Smith, How Campus Sexual Assaults Came to Command Attention, ALL
THINGS CONSIDERED (Aug. 12, 2014), https://perma.cc/E6RM-Y8X4 (describing a skit at Rutgers’ re-
quired orientation in which a young woman ends up in a young man’s room, resisting his increasingly
aggressive advances).
56. For example, on August 23, 2016, the author’s daughter was enrolled at Georgia State Univer-
sity and the author sat through her daughter’s online Haven sexual violence training. In that training, one
slide out of hundreds noted that 60% of all campus assaults occur in campus residence halls. Another
10
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pus housing,57 freshmen are the most vulnerable to campus sexual assault,58
and the data indicates that the majority of on-campus assaults occur in cam-
pus housing.59
Not only do education programs barely mention the risk of dorm-based
assaults, many assault reduction education efforts focus on threats external
to the dorm. For example, students are told to watch their drinks, take bud-
dies to parties, and leave people and places that might make them feel un-
safe.60 Campus safety precautions also focus on preventing stranger attacks.
For example, schools emphasize the presence of blue call boxes along cam-
pus paths, security escorts, and the swipe cards or other identification meth-
ods that limit entry into a dorm.61 This focus on security measures external
to the dorms may give students a false sense of security when they reach
their dorms because no one talks to them about the fact that the majority of
on-campus rapes occur in the dorms. The lack of awareness of risks present
in dorms leaves students unprepared for situations in which the risks mani-
fest into realities.
b. Ignoring Assault Location Means Potential Missed
Opportunities for Risk Reduction
Ignoring the data about where most on-campus rapes occur means
many schools are not focusing on risk reduction strategies for one of the
highest risk areas on campus—the dorms. Dorm-based risk reduction pro-
grams may be effective in lowering campus sexual assaults. A building
level intervention ties prevention efforts to a particular building. The CDC
found that a building level intervention program, Shifting Boundaries, was
one of three interventions that had rigorous evidence demonstrating effec-
tiveness in preventing sexual violence.62 Shifting Boundaries combined
slide noted that going to someone’s room was not consenting to sex. There was no other reference to the
risk of sexual assault occurring in dorm rooms.
57. Danielle Douglas Gabrielle, Freshmen Residency Rules Sometimes Force Students to Pay Pro-
hibitive Costs, WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 29, 2015), https://perma.cc/2H9J-54QC (noting that at least 87
colleges require freshmen to live in on-campus housing).
58. Kimble et al., supra note 8. R
59. See supra Section II(B) (discussing data on campus sexual assault location).
60. See The Realities of Sexual Assault, BESTCOLLEGES.COM (2016), https://perma.cc/P4FX-DUPA
(advising students to watch their drinks, party with friends, and leave people and places that make you
feel unsafe); Sexual Assault Risk Reduction Strategies, CORNELL COLLEGE (2016), https://perma.cc/
Z9WD-7WDZ (Cornell College risk reduction guidelines which focus attention on campus parties).
61. Over 25 years ago, it was noted that these kinds of external security measures misdirect atten-
tion to stranger rape on campus when the real problem is acquaintance rape. Terry Nicole Steinberg,
Rape on College Campuses: Reform Through Title IX, 18 J.C. & U.L. 40, 48 (1991).
62. Sarah DeGue et al., A Systematic Review of Primary Prevention Strategies for Sexual Violence
Perpetration, 16 AGGRESSION AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 346, 352 (2014).
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classroom education efforts about respecting others’ boundaries63 with
building-based interventions such as placing posters throughout the build-
ing to increase awareness of sexual violence dangers and encourage report-
ing and identifying hot spot areas that required greater faculty and security
supervision.64 Those interventions reduced middle school sexual assaults.65
While all of the Shifting Boundaries interventions may not be directly appli-
cable to college dorms, some of them may be transferrable. In particular,
visible reminders of risk factors, risk reduction techniques, and the need to
report assaults could be placed throughout dorms via posters, or even flyers
posted on the back of all dorm bathroom stall doors. Personal boundary
education could also potentially be introduced in dorm-based settings.
The Shifting Boundaries interventions are simply one example of what
colleges might do if they paid attention to where most on-campus rapes
happen. They also could experiment with other building-level interventions
to see if they resulted in risk reduction. Do bigger scale interventions such
as strict enforcement of “no overnight guest rules” and “no alcohol” poli-
cies significantly reduce assault risks?66 Does it make a difference if dorms
are single sex, co-ed by floor, co-ed by hall, or co-ed by room? Are there
particular kinds of dorm populations67 and dorm configurations that put stu-
dents at greater risk? None of this suggests that schools would have an
obligation to go back to single sex dorms or “no overnight visitors” polices,
but if studies indicated certain dorm configurations or dorm policies
presented a significantly smaller risk, schools might have an obligation to
disclose that information to students and parents. However, as long as
schools ignore where assaults occur, information is unlikely to be devel-
oped or disclosed.
63. Bruce G. Taylor et al., Shifting Boundaries: Final Report on an Experimental Evaluation of a
Youth Dating Violence Prevention Program in New York City Middle Schools, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
238–42 (Oct. 2011), https://perma.cc/FZ4F-ADE7 (setting forth the Restricting Boundaries Agree-
ments).
64. Id. at 5.
65. Id. at 71.
66. One study published in an online blog suggests that alcohol bans combined with bans on over-
night guests significantly reduce campus sexual assault risks. B. Richardson and J. Shields, The Real
Campus Sexual Assault Problem and How to Fix It, COMMENTARY (Oct. 1, 2015), https://perma.cc/
FAS4-2RG7. While that study was not peer reviewed, it does raise interesting questions. While it is
unlikely that colleges, parents, and students will agree that a return to the 1950s type of dorm regulations
are viable or desirable, valid and reliable studies can provide parents and students with information that
may be useful as they choose colleges or make dorm selections.
67. Earlier studies suggested that men living in all-male dorms, when co-ed dorms were also an
option, were more likely to commit sexual assaults than those living in co-ed dorms. BOHMER & PAR-
ROT, supra note 3, at 22. Whether that has changed since the study was done decades ago is another R
issue worth examining.
12
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III. LEGISLATION, REGULATORY LIMITS AND COLLEGES’ MOTIVATION
TO ADDRESS INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES
A. The Limited Utility of Transparency Regulations
The question remains: what will force schools to pay attention to the
risk of dorm-based sexual assaults? One solution may be to strengthen regu-
latory disclosure requirements in the hope that disclosure will both allow
students to better protect themselves and pressure schools to engage in
meaningful risk reduction efforts. However, for the reasons discussed be-
low, transparency regulations, standing alone, are unlikely to significantly
reduce the risk of dorm-based sexual assaults.
The Clery Act already mandates that schools disclose campus sexual
violence crimes and where those crimes occur.68 The hope was that the
Clery Act’s transparency requirements would inform students and parents
of potential dangers69 and would create pressure for colleges to actively
address crime problems, thus making college campuses safer.70 Unfortu-
nately, due to underreporting,71 confusion about the data,72 and consumer
access to and use of the data,73 the Clery Act’s goals have not materialized
when it comes to campus sexual assaults.74 Unless policymakers study why
the Clery Act has been relatively ineffective and make the necessary
changes to account for its problems, it is likely that the same problems that
plague existing Clery Act reports would occur if regulators mandated that
schools disclose the number of sexual assaults occurring in their dorms.
68. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1092(f)(1)(F) (West 2013).
69. Susan P. Stuart, Participatory Lawyering & the Ivory Tower: Conducting a Forensic Law Audit
in the Aftermath of Virginia Tech, 35 J.C. & U.L. 323, 381 (2009) (noting “[t]he Act was intended to
increase student awareness of criminal activity on campus and thereby make the students safer”).
70. Cantalupo, supra note 3, at 244 (noting that the Act’s goal was to increase public awareness of R
crime so that prospective students and their parents could make more knowledgeable decisions about
which schools to attend and to move from a culture in which schools turned a blind eye toward criminal
activity, including campus sexual assaults).
71. See infra Section III(A)(1) (discussing under-reporting).
72. See infra notes 90–94 (discussing confusion about Clery Act data).
73. See infra notes 105–110 (discussing the general public’s lack of awareness of Clery Act data
and its relative inaccessibility).
74. See, e.g., Bonnie Fisher et al., Making Campuses Safer for Students: The Clery Act as Symbolic
Legal Reform, 32 STETSON L. REV. 61, 88 (2002) (concluding that the Clery Act has not fulfilled its goal
of providing campus communities with valid and reliable safety information); see also Cantalupo, supra
note 3, at 244–52 (discussing how the Clery Act has failed to increase parents’ and students’ awareness
of campus sexual assaults and thus also failed to create the hoped-for public pressure on schools to
better respond to campus sexual assault issues).
13
Curcio: Institutional Failure, Campus Sexual Assault and Danger in the Dorms
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2017
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\78-1\MON102.txt unknown Seq: 14 29-MAR-17 14:14
44 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 78
1. Underreporting Problems
One reason the Clery Act reports have had minimal impact is that they
vastly understate the campus sexual assault problem. Despite studies show-
ing the widespread occurrence of acquaintance rape on college campuses,
91% of college campuses reported zero rapes in 2014.75
The gap between the studies and Clery Act reports is due, in part, to
students’ reluctance to report.76 Students’ reluctance to disclose sexual as-
saults occurs for numerous reasons,77 including actual, or perceived, inhos-
pitable reporting environments.78 Regulations attempt to address this inhos-
pitable reporting environment in order to increase students’ willingness to
report sexual violence.79 However, even when students do report, schools
often fail to accurately account for what they have learned.80
One study found that during Department of Education audits, “univer-
sities submit sexual assault incident reports that are an estimated 44%
higher than prior submissions. When the investigation is complete, reported
rates of sexual assault return to levels prior to intervention by the DoE.”81
This data suggests that schools underreport known instances of sexual as-
saults unless they are under heightened government scrutiny.82 The study’s
author further noted that audits only look at existing records—if no record
exists, it cannot be part of the audit. Thus, the actual rate of undercounting
could be far higher than the study demonstrates if schools fail to put any-
thing in writing.83 The reasons schools underreport for Clery Act purposes
are also likely to be reasons schools are reluctant to confront the fact that
the majority of on-campus rapes happen in dorm rooms. Thus, the next
section explores why some schools underreport.
75. 91% of Colleges Reported Zero Incidents of Rape in 2014, AAUW (Nov. 23, 2015), https://per
ma.cc/J9GB-5Q5N.
76. Some estimate that more than 90% of rapes go unreported. Fisher et al., supra note 9, at 24.
77. See Cantor et al., supra note 21, at 36 (the most often heard reason for not reporting was that R
the incident was not serious enough to report, followed by students’ feelings of embarrassment, shame
or concerns it would be emotionally distressing; 29% stated that they did not report because they be-
lieved nothing would be done about it). Many of these reasons are rooted in explicit and implicit gender
bias stereotypes that are prevalent in society and about which IHEs could and should educate students.
78. Cantalupo, supra note 3, at 213 (noting that studies found reluctance to report exists for many R
reasons, including fear of not being believed, fear of hostile treatment by the authorities and feeling like
even if the assault was reported, nothing would happen).
79. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1092 (f)(1)(F) (West 2013).
80. See Corey Rayburn Yung, Concealing Campus Sexual Assault: An Empirical Examination, 21
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1, 6 (2015).
81. Id. at 6.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 7.
14
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2. Financial and Reputational Reporting Disincentives
If schools accurately report crimes and sexual assaults, they admit a
problem exists on their campus—a challenging admission for many univer-
sity officials. In a 2015 survey of college and university presidents, one-
third agreed that sexual assault is prevalent at American colleges and uni-
versities, but only six percent agreed it was prevalent at their own institu-
tion.84 Given the widespread publicity about the high rate of campus sexual
assaults, why do only one-third surveyed think it is a problem, and why do
so few university administrators admit the problem exists on their own cam-
pus?85 Most likely their denial springs from fears that accurate reporting, or
even acknowledgement of the problem, puts schools at a competitive disad-
vantage86 and requires colleges to allocate funds to combat campus peer
sexual violence.
A school that underreports maintains the illusion of a bucolic safe
campus environment.87 Schools that accurately report campus sexual vio-
lence must combat the misconception that they are uniquely dangerous
places, putting those schools at a potential competitive disadvantage when
recruiting students and even raising money from alumni and community
members.88 As Professor Nancy Chi Cantalupo thoughtfully explains,
schools that seek to accurately identify the extent of the problem “are left
with having not only to explain why increased reports of sexual violence
are a good thing, but also why the vast majority of campus sexual violence
cannot be addressed through better lighting, blue light phones, and police
escort services.”89 To combat societal misunderstandings and misconcep-
tions about stranger rape myths, to shift to understanding that most on-cam-
pus assaults occur in dorms and are committed by friends and acquaint-
ances, and to explain why schools with a large number of reports actually
84. The 2015 Inside Higher Ed Survey of College and University Presidents, GALLUP & INSIDE
HIGHER EDUC. 18 (2015), https://perma.cc/NU4T-DNP7.
85. As Michael Kimmel points out, in some cases, the denial may be accurate. For example, com-
munity college presidents who head campuses with no living quarters or campus parties may, in fact,
accurately assess the risk on their campuses. Michael Kimmel, A Recipe for Sexual Assault, THE ATLAN-
TIC (Aug. 24, 2015), https://perma.cc/YK8E-TZ8P.
86. “Higher education in the United States is a competitive business, and those institutions compet-
ing for students are overwhelmingly private entities. Even publicly-funded state schools still compete for
the best students, tuition dollars, and future alumni donations. A school’s reputation is critically impor-
tant in such a competitive system. Although factors such as academic reputation, curriculum, and cost
likely count as the most important criteria for most students and parents, a reputation as a dangerous
place—especially as a place where a large number of daughters and young women are victims of rape—
must be damaging to a school.” Cantalupo, supra note 3, at 224. R
87. Id. at 219.
88. Id. at 224.
89. Id. at 221.
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are likely doing a better job addressing the campus sexual assault problem90
are expensive, time-consuming, uphill battles.91 It is much easier to turn a
blind eye and pretend sexual violence, and in particular sexual violence in
college dormitories, is not an issue. Additionally, once schools identify the
scope of the problem, they must devote resources to addressing it. In terms
of student recruiting, alumni fundraising, and taking steps to address the
problem, schools currently have strong financial disincentives to downplay
the extent of campus sexual violence and where that violence occurs.
3. Legal Liability Disincentives
Existing regulations and legal frameworks create an odd assortment of
incentives and disincentives when it comes to accurately reporting campus
sexual violence. Failure to comply with the Clery Act reporting require-
ments may result in substantial fines.92 Additionally, failure to develop ap-
propriate post-assault reporting procedures can lead to Title IX enforcement
actions and civil litigation.93 Thus, on the one hand, the Clery Act and Title
IX provide legal incentives to accurately report and appropriately deal with
reports of campus sexual violence.
However, on the other hand, Title IX liability for failure to take appro-
priate preventative action requires proof a school had actual knowledge of
sexual violence.94 This actual knowledge requirement incentivizes underre-
porting. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School District,95 the actual knowledge requirement encour-
ages schools to find ways to avoid actual knowledge and thus avoid Title IX
liability for failure to intervene to protect the plaintiff from peer sexual
violence.96 Additionally, existing tort law frameworks also serve as a disin-
90. Id. at 223.
91. See generally Teresa Amott, Increased Reporting of Sexual Assaults is a Positive Trend, THE
REGISTER-MAIL (June 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/RQ82-2R3J (explaining why Knox Colleges’ high re-
ported assaults in a 2016 Washington Post story was a positive, rather than negative, development).
92. “When a student feels his or her school has not acted in accordance with its responsibilities
under the Clery Act, the student may file a complaint with the United States Department of Education,
which has the capacity to fine schools up to $35,000 per violation. The largest fine to date has been
$350,000.” Schroeder, supra note 5, at 1214 (footnotes omitted). R
93. See, e.g., MJ Slaby & Dustin Doparik, University of Tennessee Settles Title IX Lawsuit for 2.48
Million, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL (July 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/3MER-Y86B (detailing Title IX
lawsuit allegations alleging mishandling of assault reports by University of Tennessee); Jake New, Ma-
jor Sexual Assault Settlement, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (July 21, 2014), https://perma.cc/9TYN-F6L3
(describing University of Connecticut’s 1.3 million dollar settlement based on Title IX lawsuit alleging
deliberate indifference with regard to sexual assault complaints).
94. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283 (1998).
95. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
96. Id. at 300–01 (Stephens, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s “actual knowledge require-
ment” incentivizes schools to insulate themselves from knowledge of sexual misconduct in order to
immunize themselves from damages liability).
16
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centive to acknowledge and address campus sexual violence. In the context
of determining a school’s negligence, courts currently rely heavily on evi-
dence of prior similar incidents occurring in or near where the plaintiff’s
alleged assault occurred to determine foreseeability—a predicate to a suc-
cessful negligence claim.97 To the extent schools comply with Clery Act
reporting requirements, they create potential tort liability by establishing
foreseeability of future acquaintance assaults. Thus schools have potential
legal liability reporting disincentives both when it comes to reporting gener-
ally and when it comes to disclosing the fact that most of the on-campus
assaults are occurring in their dorms.
B. The Clery Act: Individual Decision-Making Processes and Schools’
Superior Knowledge of the Risks
Forcing disclosure, and hence transparency, has become a widespread
regulatory approach to a huge range of public policy problems.98 The the-
ory is that disclosure allows people to make informed decisions that will
then incentivize institutional change.99 That was the hope when the Clery
Act was enacted.100 However, that hope has not materialized.
Schools compile the Clery Act data and know, or should know, that a
significant percent of reported campus sexual assaults occur in dorm rooms.
They know, or should know, that their own Clery Act data is just the tip of
the iceberg given the vast underreporting problem.101 Their Title IX officers
know, or should know, about the national studies indicating the high inci-
dence of dorm-based campus sexual assaults.102 In contrast, parents and
students are unlikely to have the same knowledge about the high risk of
peer rapes occurring in campus housing. Two different studies suggest the
vast majority of students were completely unaware of Clery Act data and
97. See infra text accompanying note 185. Tyler Brewer, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Com-
bating Sexual Assaults on College Campuses By Recognizing the College-Student Relationship, 44 J.L.
& EDUC. 345, 357 (2015).
98. ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 23–24
(2007).
99. Id. at 28–30.
100. “Proponents of the Act hoped to reduce individual risk. By notifying students, faculty, staff, and
visitors of criminal activity occurring on campus, institutions can make individuals aware of the poten-
tial risks so they can make active choices about their personal behavior.” Dennis E. Gregory and Steven
M. Janosik, The Clery Act: How Effective Is It? Perceptions from the Field—The Current State of the
Research and Recommendations for Improvement, 32 STETSON L. REV. 7, 40 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
101. See supra Section III(A)(1) (discussing underreporting).
102. See supra Section II(B) (discussing data about the high incidence of campus sexual assaults
occurring in college dorms).
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did not consider it when deciding where to attend college.103 Those study
results are not surprising.
Before information is used to make choices, it must be easily accessi-
ble at a time and place when it is likely to be used.104 Thus, for example,
data about campus sexual assaults occurring in college dorm rooms would
likely be most useful if it appeared in a prominent place on campus housing
web pages. However, this is not where one is most likely to see Clery Act
data. Many colleges disclose Clery Act data through a series of website
links and then bury it at the end of a lengthy document.105 Alternatively, it
can be accessed on a government website106—somewhere most people do
not go unless they are involved in a particular research project. Addition-
ally, as noted earlier, the information itself is hard to comprehend107 and is
subject to misapprehensions and misinterpretations.108
In sum, while schools are, or should be, aware of the high rate of
dorm-based peer rapes, parents and students likely do not have that same
level of awareness. Unless policymakers address the issues identified
above, transparency regulations are unlikely to increase public awareness of
the “dangers in the dorm” and hence are unlikely to increase public pressure
on IHEs to engage in meaningful dorm-based sexual assault risk reduction.
103. Gregory & Janosik, supra note 100, at 41–43 (2002) (reviewing studies showing most students R
had no knowledge about the data). One study also found that only about 10 percent of students reported
using the data as part of their college selection decision-making process. Gregory & Janosik, supra note
100, at 46. R
104. FUNG ET AL., supra note 98, at 56–57 (discussing how information has to be provided in a time R
and place that makes it accessible and available when people are about to make decisions).
105. For example, Harvard’s Clery Act disclosure may be found by clicking through a series of links
on the Harvard University Police Department homepage, which is not itself accessible from the harvard
.edu sitemap. See Sitemap, HARVARD UNIVERSITY (2017), https://perma.cc/YNG4-FZDB; Clery Act Sta-
tistics, HARVARD UNIVERSITY POLICE DEPARTMENT (2017), https://perma.cc/TZF8-EUCE. See also Uni-
versity of Michigan Annual Security Report & Annual Fire Safety Report, THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVER-
SITY OF MICHIGAN (2016), https://perma.cc/752Y-6KKT (accessible from the University of Michigan’s
primary website by selecting Menu>Life at Michigan>Public Safety and Security>Statistics and Clery
Act Compliance>Annual Security Report and Annual Fire Safety Report, University of Michigan, UNI-
VERSITY OF MICHIGAN (2017), https://perma.cc/HG9N-8LQ3).
106. USDE Data Analysis, supra note 38. R
107. FUNG ET AL., supra note 98, at 59 (noting that material that is difficult to comprehend is one R
reason transparency regulations fail to achieve their goals).
108. Id. at 73–74 (noting that confusing information is another reason transparency regulations fail).
As noted supra in text accompanying notes 79–85 and 90–92, the Clery Act data itself likely is mislead-
ing due to vast under reporting, and the data itself is subject to misinterpretation in that most people
likely assume that fewer reports mean a safer campus, rather than understand that more reports indicate
a campus that is responsive to complaints of sexual assault and is creating an atmosphere hospitable to
reporting and addressing the problem).
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C. The Limited Utility of Existing Prevention
and Education Regulations
1. Ramstad Amendment
In 1992, Congress passed the Ramstad Amendment to the Higher Edu-
cation Act which required schools to engage in awareness and prevention
education, identify the procedures that would be followed when a sex of-
fense occurs, and to publicize possible sanctions that could be imposed fol-
lowing a disciplinary proceeding adjudication.109 Despite the Ramstad
Amendment, for over two decades many colleges turned a blind eye to cam-
pus acquaintance assaults and did little to help those who had the courage to
report those assaults.110 Recent regulations attempt to remedy that problem.
2. VAWA Regulations Requiring Awareness and Prevention Education
Title IX prohibits schools receiving federal funding from discriminat-
ing on the basis of sex.111 As Title IX law developed, its prohibition of
discrimination based upon sex began to encompass discrimination occur-
ring as a result of student-on-student sexual violence.112 Over the years,
Title IX spawned numerous rules and regulations designed to help reduce
the high rate of campus sexual assaults,113 among them a recommendation
that schools engage in sexual assault prevention education.114 That recom-
109. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1092(f) (West 2013).
110. See, e.g., Edwin Rios & Madison Pauly, This Explosive Lawsuit Could Change How Colleges
Deal with Athletes Accused of Sexual Assault, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 3, 2016), https://perma.cc/WN5J-
KXMK (discussing allegations of the University of Tennessee’s institutional indifference to campus
sexual assaults); see Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007) (detailing how the
University of Colorado ignored known issue of assaults committed by football players); Sarah L. Sawn,
Bystander Interventions, 2015 WISC. L. REV. 975, 1020 (2015) (noting that until recently, the law has
allowed colleges to ignore the campus sexual assault problem). Vice President Joe Biden also noted that
colleges have historically turned a blind eye toward campus sexual assault. See Aamer Madhani &
Rachel Axon, Biden: Colleges Must Step Up to Prevent Sexual Assault, USA TODAY (Apr. 29, 2014),
https://perma.cc/PJ2W-386Z. Not all colleges have ignored the problem. Some colleges were early lead-
ers in the movement to reduce campus sexual assault risks. See, e.g., BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 3, R
at 129 (discussing Cornell University’s sexual assault and prevention programs that began in the early
1980s).
111. Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y of Civ. Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Colleagues
(Apr. 4, 2011), https://perma.cc/8Z7L-L3R6 [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter] (addressing sexual vio-
lence as a form of sexual harassment under Title IX and listing protocols and requirements that would be
used to assess schools’ compliance with Title IX); see also 20 U.S.C.A. § 1092(f)(1)(F) (West 2013)
(embedding many of the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter protocols and requirements into legislation).
112. For an excellent summary of Title IX’s development into a statute recognizing that peer-on-
peer sexual assaults can be a form of educational sexual discrimination, see Wendy Adele Humphrey,
“Let’s Talk About Sex”: Legislating and Educating on the Affirmative Consent Standard, 50 U.S.F. L.
REV. 35, 41–55 (2016).
113. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 111. R
114. Id.
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mendation became a mandate in 2013 when Congress imposed additional
obligations on colleges and universities as part of the Violence Against Wo-
men Reauthorization Act.115
Today, colleges and universities must develop “education programs to
promote the awareness of rape, acquaintance rape, domestic violence, dat-
ing violence, sexual assault and stalking.”116 These education programs
must include primary prevention and awareness programs for all incoming
students and new employees and ongoing prevention and awareness cam-
paigns for existing students and faculty on the following topics: (1) the
school’s prohibition of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault
and stalking; (2) a jurisdictional definition of those terms; (3) a jurisdic-
tional definition of consent in reference to sexual activity; (4) safe options
for bystander intervention to prevent harm or intervene in risky situations;
and (5) recognition of signs of abusive behavior and how to avoid potential
attacks.117 How schools educate students about these topics is left to
schools’ discretion118 so that they can experiment with content and method-
ology.119 However, these non-prescriptive education and awareness regula-
tions may have a limited risk reduction impact for the reasons discussed
below.
3. Regulations Do Not Require Schools to Address Where Most On-
Campus Assaults Occur
Existing regulations do not require schools to educate students about
where most assaults occur. While educating students about where assaults
occur is not as important as engaging students in both attitude and behav-
ioral change education,120 identifying college dorm rooms as a high risk
area when it comes to campus rapes is an important component in risk re-
duction efforts. Current regulations require bystander intervention strategy
education.121 Before bystanders intervene, they must become aware of the
115. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 § 304, 20 U.S.C.A § 1092(f)(8) (West
2013).
116. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(i).
117. Id.
118. The regulations do not mandate specific content beyond the topics identified and do not man-
date a mode of delivery because there is a hope that allowing flexibility will encourage research on a
range of practices that may be both cost-efficient and effective in prevention efforts. See 34 C.F.R.
§ 668.46(j) (2015).
119. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 111. Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y R
of Civ. Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Colleagues, Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual
Violence (Apr. 29, 2014), https://perma.cc/2HGT-KUM8.
120. For a discussion of the key components of effective college assault prevention education ef-
forts, see DeGue et al., supra note 62 at 356-58 (discussing evidence-based, successful risk reduction R
programs, most of which focus on attitudes and behavioral changes).
121. 20 U.S.C. § 109(f)(8)2(B)(i)(1)(dd) (2015).
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problem and how to identify potentially risky situations. To put it simply: to
avoid a risk, one must be aware of that risk. If colleges do not affirmatively
alert students to the fact that most on-campus peer rapes occur in dorm
rooms, students may have no idea that they need to engage in risk reduction
strategies in their dorms or be ready to intervene in their dorms. If schools
are not confronting the reality of what happens in dorms, their mandatory
risk reduction education will not provide strategies for these situations.
4. Some Schools Are Satisfying the Regulations Using Ineffective
Education Methods
Many schools currently comply with the regulatory mandates by re-
quiring incoming students to engage in a video training session122 that is
unlikely to be an effective education tool. While that programming may
satisfy the letter of the regulatory requirements, it is unlikely to satisfy the
intended goal of reducing sexually violent behaviors, resulting in risk re-
duction.123 While programs that can be completed via a one-time online
course may be cost-effective, there is no evidence that that type of educa-
tive program has any benefits when it comes to sexual violence risk reduc-
tion.124
As college educators should know, long-term retention and transfera-
bility of learning occurs when students are given information in manageable
chunks and have multiple opportunities, across multiple situations, and in
multiple formats to retrieve and apply the information they are asked to
learn.125 While some schools may be engaging in broad-ranging and more
effective student awareness and risk reduction education, others may be
simply “checking the education box” via a one-time video. In part, this may
be due to the fact that the regulations are relatively new and schools are still
working out how best to comply. It may also be due to the fact that the
regulations impose significant additional burdens upon schools without pro-
viding funding that enables schools to do anything more than engage in
minimal compliance.126 Whatever the reason, regulations that are vague as
122. EverFi, the company developing and marketing the Haven online sexual assault video modules,
claims that they are in use at “over 650 institutions across the country.” Haven—Understanding Sexual
Assault, EVERFI (Oct. 27, 2016), https://perma.cc/29PY-T4GQ.
123. See DeGue, supra note 62, at 357 (discussing the limited impact of single-session prevention
efforts).
124. Id. at 358–59 (noting a need to shift away from low-dose educational programs).
125. Diane F. Halpern & Milton D. Hakel, Applying the Science of Learning to the University and
Beyond, 35(4) CHANGE 36, 38–39 (2003).
126. Eric Kelderman, College Lawyers Confront a Thicket of Rules on Sexual Assault, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC. (June 25, 2014), https://perma.cc/YS7X-VLR8 (noting that schools have numerous regu-
lations they must comply with and limited resources to engage in compliance as well as prevention
measures).
21
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to content, structure, and delivery of awareness and prevention information
may not motivate schools to engage in meaningful education and awareness
efforts, and they certainly will not motivate schools to disclose what is hap-
pening in their own dorms.
D. What Has Motivated Change: Litigation and Enforcement Actions
While the Ramstad Amendment and Clery Act have not worked as
hoped, and the mandated prevention and awareness education requirements
likely will not be terribly effective at reducing assault risks at many schools,
one set of regulations, combined with litigation and enforcement actions,
has created momentum for change. In 2011, the Department of Education’s
Office of Civil Rights (OCR) issued what has become known as the “Dear
Colleague Letter,”127 which laid out procedures for how schools should in-
vestigate and adjudicate sexual assault reports.128
The Dear Colleague Letter, although controversial for a host of rea-
sons,129 provided plaintiff’s lawyers the ammunition they needed to begin
holding schools accountable for how they handled sexual assault reports.
The specificity of the required procedures laid the groundwork for allega-
tions that schools had violated Title IX. By the end of 2013, two years after
the Dear Colleague Letter, a higher education insurance company found
that claims against universities arising from campus sexual assaults had
doubled.130 Victims’ claims consisted of demand letters, claims filed with
the OCR, and civil lawsuits.131 Virtually all victims’ claims focused on how
schools dealt with assault reports in violation of the Dear Colleague Letter
advisory guidelines. The allegations included: discouraging pursuit of a
complaint, failure to timely investigate, inadequate sanctions, negligent
training of staff in terms of investigation and handling assault reports, and
failure of a school to follow its own procedures.132 Approximately one-third
127. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 111. R
128. Id. at 2.
129. See, e.g., Amy Chmielewski, Note, Defending The Preponderance of The Evidence Standard in
College Adjudications of Sexual Assault, 2013 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 143, 145–46 (2013) (discussing the
debate about the Dear Colleague Letter’s preponderance of the evidence standard for campus sexual
assault disciplinary hearings); Corey Rayburn Yung, Is Relying on Title IX a Mistake?, 64 U. KAN. L.
REV. 891, 898–99 (2016) (noting that there is an ongoing debate as to whether the Dear Colleague
Letters constituted rulemaking without following the process proscribed by the Administrative Proce-
dures Act).
130. Confronting Campus Sexual Assault: An Examination of Higher Education Claims, EDURISK
SOLUTIONS 3 (Jan. 2015), https://perma.cc/8GKM-X49P [hereinafter Higher Education Claims].
131. Id. at 14, 16.
132. Id. at 15–16.
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of the claims were filed by the accused, challenging the fairness of the insti-
tution’s adjudicatory process and alleging a lack of due process.133
Publicity arising from Title IX litigation has exposed widespread insti-
tutional failures including schools’ cover-ups of sexual assault occur-
rences.134 Litigation and resulting publicity has caused schools to sit up and
take notice of the problem. Schools realize that failure to properly handle
assault reports may result in loss of federal funding135 and have reputational
and compensatory damage costs.136 Thus, exacting regulations, actions to
enforce those regulations, and resultant publicity have made schools pay
attention to how they handle assault reports.137
The question is whether Title IX actions are likely to motivate schools
to pay attention to dorm-based assaults or to engage in meaningful and ef-
fective risk reduction programs. The answer is “probably not.” Title IX re-
quires proof of actual knowledge of the alleged danger138 and a response
133. Id. at 17; see also Jake New, Out of Balance, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 14, 2016), https://per
ma.cc/D679-XUZP (discussing numerous cases in which courts found for alleged perpetrators who
claimed the universities’ procedures failed to provide them sufficient due process).
134. See, e.g., Manohla Dargis, Review: ‘The Hunting Ground’ Documentary, A Searing Look at
Campus Rape, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2015) (discussing documentary about campus rape and institutional
cover-ups). The documentary itself spawned publicity. See, e.g., Emily Yoffe, The Hunting Ground—A
Closer Look at the Influential Documentary, SLATE (June 1, 2015), https://perma.cc/K927-Q3EJ; Ana
Merlan, What Emily Yoffe Left Out of her Polemic on The Hunting Ground, JEZEBEL (Dec. 4, 2015),
https://perma.cc/HMX8-ZZRN.
135. Government agencies that fund schools and school loan programs may enforce compliance with
Title IX via the ultimate penalty of withdrawing that funding for noncompliance. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682
(1972).
136. See, e.g., Anita Wadhwani, Settling Sex Assault Lawsuits Costs Universities Millions, THE TEN-
NESSEAN (July 6, 2016), https://perma.cc/F5AM-ZMHT (noting the following settlements of sexual as-
sault claims: In January 2016, Florida State settled a lawsuit for $950,000; in August 2015, the Univer-
sity of Oregon settled a lawsuit for $800,000; in July 2014, the University of Connecticut settled a suit
for $1.28 million; in Sept 2013, Occidental College agreed to a confidential settlement with 37 students;
and in 2007, the University of Colorado settled a claim for $2.5 million dollars).
137. Kelderman, supra note 126 (noting that stricter enforcement of Title IX, the “Know Your IX” R
national movement informing students how to file federal complaints, the DOE’s investigations, and
lawsuits against institutions have schools grappling with how best to investigate and resolve campus
sexual assault reports). For an example of the publicity a Title IX suit may engender, see Duke Student
Pub. Co., Duke Sued for Mishandling Sexual Assault Investigation, DUKE CHRONICLE (Aug. 17, 2016),
https://perma.cc/M9WS-9TXN; Tyler Kingkade, UNC Sexual Assault Response to Be Investigated by
U.S. Department of Education, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 6, 2013), https://perma.cc/5LND-9PD2; Tyler
Kingkade, Occidental College Seizes Faculty Laptops As Feds Investigate Sexual Assault Cases, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2013), https://perma.cc/2GVJ-G7NJ; Eliana Dockterman, Students File Title IX
Sexual Assault Complaint Against Columbia University, TIME (Apr. 24, 2014), https://perma.cc/NE56-
XJLD; Jessica Bennett, The Title IX Complaint Against Yale, THE DAILY BEAST (Apr. 2, 2011), https://
perma.cc/V324-38JE.
138. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. Actual notice is a difficult standard to satisfy and it does not encom-
pass “inquiry” notice (i.e., the obligation to undertake an investigation on the knowledge one possesses
which would then likely result in actual knowledge). Grayson Sang Walker, The Evolution and Limits of
Title IX Doctrine on Peer Sexual Assault, 45 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 95, 108 n.92 (2010).
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that exhibits a deliberate indifference139 with regard to that danger. This is
an extremely difficult standard to satisfy.140 Unless schools ignore their
duty to educate altogether, it will be difficult for plaintiffs to successfully
assert a Title IX case based on the inadequacy of schools’ assault awareness
and prevention education, although a negligence claim could raise that is-
sue.
Negligence claims may provide a basis for liability because, unlike the
Title IX “actual knowledge” standard, negligence claims allow for liability
if a school knew or should have known of a risk.141 Additionally, unlike the
high bar of the Title IX “deliberate indifference” standard, negligence
claims may succeed upon proof the defendant failed to act with reasonable
care in light of the circumstances, a calculus that often involves calculating
the risk of harm and the cost of preventing that harm.142 Thus, negligence
claims may fill a regulatory and Title IX enforcement action gap when it
comes to motivating schools to engage in meaningful awareness and risk
reduction education.
IV. THE PROMISE OF NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS FRAMED
AS INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE
As Professor Timothy Lytton explains, tort litigation provides an op-
portunity for both external and self-regulatory policy changes because it
provides an alternative venue to the regulatory process and provides an op-
portunity to frame issues in a way that generate both public awareness and
public pressure for meaningful institutional changes.143 He notes:
139. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
140. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (holding that a Title IX
plaintiff suing a school for damages resulting from peer-on-peer sexual harassment must demonstrate:
actual knowledge, deliberate indifference, severe, pervasive and objectively offensive peer sexual har-
assment, and a deprivation of educational opportunities. Once those elements are met, a court then must
decide whether the institution’s conduct was “clearly unreasonable”); see also Walker, supra note 138, R
at 101 (noting that securing monetary or injunctive relief under Title IX is “exceedingly difficult” be-
cause the standard “allows negligent and reckless schools to avoid institutional liability so long as their
response to an elevated risk of assault or a specific incident is ‘not clearly unreasonable’”).
141. See, e.g., Ross v. Univ. of Tulsa, No. 14-cv-484-TCK-PJC, 2016 WL 1545138, at *21 (N.D.
Okla. Apr. 15, 2016) (noting that “[u]nlike Title IX’s ‘actual knowledge’ standard, the question of duty
in a negligence action can also encompass inquiry notice—what TU should have known about Swilling
in the exercise of reasonable diligence,” but deciding “it could not conclude” that the exercise of reason-
able care would have alerted TU to the risk to all students posed by the alleged rapist student given only
one unprosecuted prior report of an alleged rape by the student who raped the plaintiff at an off-campus
apartment).
142. Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1015–16 (1994) (noting
that “the proposition that negligence means creating an ‘unreasonable risk,’ defined as one whose ex-
pected costs exceed the costs of avoiding it, has been explicitly endorsed by the Restatement of Torts, by
the leading treatises, and by courts in most states”).
143. Timothy D. Lytton, Using Tort Litigation to Enhance Regulatory Policy Making: Evaluating
Climate-Change Litigation in Light of Lessons from Gun-Industry and Clergy-Sexual-Abuse Lawsuits,
24
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[There are] six distinct ways in which litigation influences policy making: by
(1) framing issues in terms of institutional failure and the need for institu-
tional reform; (2) generating policy-relevant information; (3) placing issues
on the agendas of policy-making institutions; (4) filling gaps in statutory or
administrative regulatory schemes; (5) encouraging self-regulation; and (6)
allowing for diverse regulatory approaches in different jurisdictions.144
While campus sexual assault is already on policymaking institutions’
agendas,145 tort negligence litigation can serve some of the other purposes
Professor Lytton identifies. In particular, it can help frame the issue of cam-
pus sexual assaults as institutional failures rather than as a problem of indi-
vidual drunken, immature, or irresponsible students. It may produce infor-
mation in discovery that is useful when it comes to policymaking and future
regulations. It also can encourage IHE self-regulation via public disclosures
and media exposure, resulting in public pressure for schools to engage in
effective education and risk-reduction programs that include dorm-based
risk reduction strategies.
A. Changing Perceptions by Changing Framing
Title IX suits and OCR complaints based upon how schools have han-
dled assault reports and how schools have allowed an “assault culture” to
flourish frame the issue as one of institutional failure.146 That same framing
could be used in suits based upon schools’ failing to address the problem in
campus dorms. Studies recognize that campus sexual assault, and all sexual
assault, is both an individual and societal problem.147 IHEs’ institutional
failures are part of the societal problem. As Professor Chi Cantalupo ex-
plains:
Sociologists and criminologists studying campus peer sexual violence have
used a theory called the Routine Activities Theory to posit that sexual vio-
lence occurs so frequently on college campuses because there is a surfeit of
‘motivated offender[s] [and] . . . suitable target[s] and an absence of capable
guardians all converg[ing] in one time and space.’ They suggest that all three
elements must be present for there to be a significant crime problem and that
the failure of schools to act as ‘capable guardians’ elevates the influence of
86 TEX. L. REV. 1837, 1841 (2008) (noting that “when an issue falls under a different institutional
jurisdiction, the change in venue may bring with it new ways of approaching the problem and different
tools for responding to it.”)
144. Id. at 1838.
145. See, e.g., Krebs, supra note 25; Campus Sexual Assault, Suggested Policies and Procedures, R
AM. ASSOC. OF UNIV. PROFESSORS (Nov. 2012), https://perma.cc/367F-PL75; Not Alone: First Report of
the White House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Apr. 2014),
https://perma.cc/5JAR-JS65.
146. See, e.g., Jane Does v. Univ. of Tenn., No. 3:16-cv-199, 2016 WL 1253004 (M.D. Ten. Mar.
29, 2016); Complaint ¶¶ 73–74, 77–80, Daisy Tackett v. Univ. of Kan., (Mar. 21, 2016) (No. 2016-cv-
000116).
147. See Breiding, supra note 13. R
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peer support to commit assaults by ‘motivated offenders.’ In other words,
cultures supportive of sexual violence can lead to higher incidences of sexual
violence. Additionally, if the institution itself ignores the problem and fails to
act as a ‘capable guardian,’ it too helps to create the problem.148
Thus, framing negligence claims against universities for their institu-
tional failures is grounded in both theory and reality. Litigation that frames
campus acquaintance assault as institutional failures takes the focus off
what a few “bad boys” have been doing and places it on how colleges have
facilitated that conduct by ignoring the problem, and in particular ignoring
where it most often occurs.
Currently, tort negligence law is unlikely to help create meaningful
institutional change because many judges do not see the problem as one of
institutional failure. Using both a popular culture and a historical fram-
ing,149 courts often characterize peer-on-peer rapes and sexual assaults as
problems attributable to individual “bad boy” students,150 or irresponsible,
often drunk, college students151—a problem outside the purview and con-
trol of colleges. The judicial approach to dorm life absolves schools of all
responsibility for what happens in their campus residence halls. It assumes
colleges play no role in defining and regulating acceptable behaviors within
their dorms or in educating students about how to avoid serious risks—even
when schools have superior knowledge of those risks.152
B. Judicial Perceptions and Framing the Issue as One
of Institutional Failure
Some plaintiff’s lawyers have already implicitly attempted to frame
campus sexual assault litigation against universities as an issue of institu-
tional failure.153 For example, in Facchetti v. Bridgewater College,154 the
plaintiff alleged both that the college was negligent in its failure to engage
in reasonable protective measures and that it attempted to cover up her as-
148. Cantalupo, supra note 3, at 221. R
149. Kathleen Mahoney, Judicial Bias: The Ongoing Challenge, 2015 J. DIS. RES. 43, 61–62 (2015)
(noting that myths about women’s sexuality and sexual assault crimes perpetuated by the media and pop
culture are so influential that even brief exposure temporarily triggers negative thoughts about sexual
assault victims and heightens thoughts of victim-blame).
150. Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape Trials, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 663, 677–78 (1998) (noting that a persistent rape myth is that rapists are violent, brutish
sex-crazed male aggressors who use extreme force against their victims).
151. See Tanja H. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 228 Cal. App. 3d 434, 438–41 (1991); Facchetti v.
Bridgewater Coll., 175 F. Supp. 3d 627, 641–42 (W.D. Va. 2016).
152. See supra Section III(B) (discussing schools’ superior knowledge of the risks of dorm-based
assaults).
153. See, e.g., Complaint, Daisy Tackett v. Univ. of Kan., ¶¶ 73–74, 77–80, (Mar. 21, 2016) (No.
2016-CV-000116), available at https://perma.cc/7GDN-YMGG (alleging facts that point to institutional
failure).
154. 175 F. Supp. 3d 627 (W.D. Va. 2016).
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sault report.155 She sued the university both under Title IX and for negli-
gence. Her negligence claim alleged the school owed her a duty to use rea-
sonable care to warn of, and protect against, her assault.156 In support of her
negligence claim, she pointed to widespread knowledge of campus sexual
assault issues157 and the college’s own knowledge that in the prior year,
there had been five reported instances of acquaintance assault in its
dorms—facts that implicitly raise institutional failure issues.158 The court
did not address the widespread knowledge allegation, and it rejected the
notion that the school could foresee the assault, finding that foreseeability
was not met by five reported incidents of acquaintance assault in the last
year occurring in the dorms on a small college campus.159 It also noted that
the college could not have caused the assault because the plaintiff invited
the boy into her room.160
Facchetti could be analyzed as a case in which incredibly naı¨ve col-
lege students would have benefitted greatly from education about the dan-
ger of acquaintance assault in dorms and how to mitigate those risks,161 or it
could be analyzed through the lens of “what do you expect a college to do
when a young woman invites a young man into her room and then falls
asleep while he is still there?” The court chose the latter approach, discount-
ing evidence of prior sexual assaults to absolve the college of responsibility
to warn and educate students about the risks of acquaintance assaults in
college dorm rooms.162
In Tanja H. v. Regents of University of California,163 a case in which a
young woman was brutally assaulted in a dorm after returning from a party,
a California court cited the oft-heard proposition that colleges are not insur-
ers of student safety.164 Working from that premise, the court went on to
determine that colleges had no ability to save young people from them-
155. Complaint ¶¶ 46–48, 98–107, Facchetti v. Bridgewater Coll., 175 F. Supp. 3d 627 (No. 5:15-
CV-00049).
156. Id. ¶¶ 98–107.
157. Id. ¶ 105.
158. Id. ¶ 26.
159. Facchetti, 175 F. Supp. 3d at 644. In addition to making that judgment call, the court noted that
plaintiff’s foreseeability argument failed because the school did not have notice the assailant himself had
committed any of the five reported prior attacks. The court’s analysis collapsed two different foresee-
ability analyses: foreseeability that a person presents a significant risk versus foreseeability that a partic-
ular location presents a significant risk of harm.
160. Id.
161. The need for education is particularly acute when it comes to international students who may
have different cultural norms. International Student Insurance created a sexual assault awareness and
education video aimed specifically at international students. See Sexual Assault Laws in the U.S., INT’L
STUDENT INS., https://perma.cc/M7CP-D3ST.
162. Facchetti, 175 F. Supp. 3d at 644.
163. 228 Cal. App. 3d 434, 435 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
164. Tanja H., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 438.
27
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selves and no responsibility to try to do so.165 Tanja H. was decided in
1990. Since then, the Department of Education166 and federal legislators167
have explicitly stated that schools do, in fact, have a legal responsibility to
engage in campus sexual assault risk reduction awareness and education.
Perhaps future courts will roundly reject the Tanja H. reasoning as outdated
both from a social and cultural perspective and because of legislative enact-
ments. However, as Facchetti illustrates, many judges still believe that
schools’ lack of meaningful warnings and education do not play a role in
acquaintance sexual assaults occurring in college dorm rooms.
Both Facchetti and Tanja H. illustrate judicial reluctance to hold insti-
tutions accountable and an unwillingness to view the problem as one of
institutional failure rather than one of individual bad actors. This framing is
not unlike what one saw at the start of clergy sexual abuse cases in which
courts and the public initially thought about the problem as one of an indi-
vidual priest’s failings,168 and initial plaintiffs faced allegations that they
had contributed to their own abuse.169 However, over time litigation ex-
posed church malfeasance—demonstrating that the church simply trans-
ferred molester priests to new parishes and failed to warn parishioners. This
information about the church’s active role in covering up its priests’ mis-
conduct re-framed the issue and led to national media coverage.170 As liti-
gation increased, and allegations of church malfeasance began to be sub-
stantiated by discovery documents and other investigation, courts and the
public began to look at the issue as one of institutional, rather than individ-
ual, failure.171 The more wrongdoing that was exposed, the more press cov-
erage, and the greater internal and external pressure for change, all of which
165. Tanja H., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 438.
166. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 111. R
167. See supra Section III(C) (discussing VAWA regulations, which may incorporate many of the
Dear Colleague Letter recommendations).
168. LYTTON, supra note 19, at 102 (noting that “the church portrayed itself as the victim of abusive R
priests who concealed their crimes from diocesan officials”).
169. Id. at 66 (noting that some defense lawyers alleged victims were negligent or assumed the risk
of abuse by continuing to spend time with priests who had abused them; others alleged that victims’
parents were negligent for allowing their children to spend time with priests the parents should have
known were abusers because the priests showed excessive interest in their children).
170. Id. at 87–94.
171. Id. at 152 (noting that initially discovery was limited to documents concerning only the priest
named in the complaint but as judges became more aware of the institutional failures, they allowed
broader discovery which in turn raised awareness of the extent of the institutional cover ups of priests’
wrongdoing).
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led to institutional self-regulation172 as well as external policy and legisla-
tive reforms.173
That also has been the pattern with Title IX suits about how schools
have handled reports of campus sexual violence. The more lawsuits, the
more publicity about how institutions have covered up or encouraged a cul-
ture of sexual misconduct, especially among its athletes, the greater the in-
ternal and external pressure for change.174 Whether tort litigation about
dorm-based assaults framed as institutional failure has the potential to moti-
vate self-regulation, complement existing regulatory schemes, and poten-
tially provide information useful to policymakers and regulators depends
upon whether judges are willing to recognize schools’ duty to engage in
meaningful education and risk reduction programs.
V. RE-THINKING COLLEGES’ DUTY OF CARE IN DORM-BASED
ACQUAINTANCE ASSAULT CLAIMS
A. The Cost of Institutional Failure
To the extent one suggests, as the author of this essay does, that IHEs
have a legal obligation to develop effective sexual assault risk reduction
programs aimed at lowering the incidence of dorm-based assaults, one must
balance the burden of developing and implementing those programs against
172. Id. at 172–76 (describing the church’s assault prevention efforts and attributing many of those
efforts to litigation). But see Mark Chopok, A Response to Timothy Lytton: More Conversation is
Needed, 39 CONN. L. REV. 897, 900 (2007) (arguing that the self-regulatory efforts were borne out of the
church’s concern for its congregants rather than litigation induced).
173. “Most of what is publicly known about clergy sexual abuse was discovered by lawyers or
comes from studies and investigations that (but for the litigation) would likely never have been under-
taken. Litigation drew attention to the role of Church officials in facilitating child sexual abuse, placed
the issue on the agendas of Church and government policy makers for the first time, and generated
pressure on them to address the problem. The results of the litigation include a public accounting of the
role of Church officials in facilitating decades of child sexual abuse, mandatory nationwide Church
policies, and a host of law enforcement and legislative reforms.” Lytton, supra note 143, at 1863. R
174. Title IX suits and OCR enforcement actions often generate intense publicity and may result in
self-regulatory changes. See, e.g., Zac Ellis, A Timeline of the Baylor Sexual Assault Scandal, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (May 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/9YBC-3ZBV; Baylor Fires Head Coach Art Briles amid
Rape Scandal, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/PV6V-PVPG (discussing how
public exposure of Baylor’s mishandling of sexual assault reports led to the dismissal of its football
coach and the removal of university president Ken Starr). At Florida State, after considerable publicity
about the mishandling of a sexual assault report, the school settled and agreed to internal reforms. See
Rachel Axon, Florida State Agrees to Pay Winston Accuser $950,000, USA TODAY (Jan. 15, 2016),
https://perma.cc/Z6QE-TMZS (noting that part of the settlement of plaintiff’s Title IX claim included
changes in FSU’s sexual assault policies and programs). However, many Title IX enforcement actions
are not widely publicized. See Tyler Kingkade, There Are Far More Title IX Investigations of Colleges
Than People Know, HUFFINGTON POST (June 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/357C-MYQ4 (discussing the
significant number of schools that have flown under the radar when it comes to publicity about alleged
Title IX violations and providing a link to a list of schools under Title IX investigation for their handling
of sexual assault reports).
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the costs to both victims and alleged perpetrators of failing to do so.175
Campus sexual violence survivors’ costs often include significant emotional
trauma, resulting psychological disorders, and education interruption. Many
survivors experience significant psychological damage that includes
“shock, humiliation, anxiety, depression, substance abuse, suicidal
thoughts, loss of self-esteem, social isolation, anger, distrust of others, fear
of AIDS, guilt, and sexual dysfunction.”176 The trauma results in many sur-
vivors experiencing a significant drop in academic performance, often lead-
ing to withdrawing from courses, and in some cases withdrawing from
school altogether as survivors take years to put their lives back together.177
In a moving essay, Laura Hilgers, whose daughter was raped on cam-
pus during her freshman year, detailed the financial costs of that rape.
These costs included her daughter’s lost wages resulting from being unable
to finish school on time, her own lost wages resulting from having to care
for her traumatized daughter, the cost of in-patient psychiatric care for
trauma and addiction (an addiction her daughter developed to numb the
pain caused by the assault), the cost of lost tuition for college work at-
tempted but unable to be completed, the cost of therapists, medication, and
other medical expenses, all of which added up to over $245,000.178 The
economic costs Ms. Hilgers reports are consistent with a White House re-
port which estimates that the monetary cost to a rape survivor can range
from $87,000 to $246,000.179 However, the financial cost tells only part of
the story. It does not account for the emotional cost to the survivor and her
family. As Ms. Hilgers eloquently writes, “It would be impossible for me to
describe in the space of a newspaper article the emotional toll this took on
Willa and our family: the grief we felt that our child’s body (and soul) had
been violated; the anger that we (and the college) could not protect her; the
fear that our once spirited, ambitious daughter might never be more than a
shell of herself.”180
Campus sexual violence suspects also incur significant costs in terms
of disrupted educations, lost tuition, legal fees, damage to reputation, and
175. This classic formulation was articulated by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir. 1947).
176. Susan Hanley Duncan, The Devil Is in the Details: Will the Campus Save Act Provide More or
Less Protection to Victims of Campus Assaults?, 40 J.C. & U.L. 443, 446 (2014).
177. Campus Sexual Assault, Suggested Policies & Procedures, AM. ASSOC. OF UNIV. PROFESSORS
(Oct. 2012), https://perma.cc/CNY3-4N5H.
178. Laura Hilgers, What One Rape Cost Our Family, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2016), https://perma.cc/
HA9J-QG43.
179. White House Council on Women and Girls, Rape and Sexual Assault: A Renewed Call to
Action, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Jan. 2014), https://perma.cc/6UGP-B4VT.
180. Hilgers, supra note 178. R
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the emotional toll of a sexual assault investigation and proceeding.181 Costs
to both the alleged perpetrator and victim when schools fail to engage stu-
dents in effective sexual assault risk reduction programs should be part of
the calculus as courts grapple with defining institutional duty and the appli-
cable standard of care. Rather than dismiss schools’ duty out of hand as
some courts have done,182 judges should employ the long-accepted negli-
gence formulation in which one balances the foreseeability of the harm, the
severity of the harm, and the cost/burden of protecting against or eliminat-
ing the harm based upon public policy reasons.
B. Re-framing Duty: Moving from Individual to Institutional Failure
1. General Duty Rules
It is one thing to suggest that tort claims be framed as institutional
failures and another to conceptualize how to move courts in that direction.
Courts have expressed two main reasons for absolving universities from
liability for dorm-based acquaintance assaults: a judgment that it is wrong
to shift moral and legal responsibility from student perpetrators to universi-
ties,183 and a fear that requiring colleges to protect students from acquain-
tance assault places a high burden on colleges that would concomitantly
require significant incursions upon student autonomy and impose a costly
and high burden on universities.184 This section suggests that those concep-
tualizations misconstrue colleges’ duty and the appropriate standard of care.
Tort negligence claims against a university for third-party sexual as-
saults require plaintiffs to prove that: the university owed them a duty to
exercise due care with regard to their safety, it breached that duty, and the
breach of duty was a cause of their injuries.185 The general rule is that no
legal duty exists to protect against criminal conduct of a third party unless
the defendant has a special relationship with either the assailant or injured
party that, for policy reasons and societal expectations, creates a special
duty of care.186
181. Matt Rocheleau, College Students Fight Sexual Assault Accusations, BOS. GLOBE (June 27,
2014), https://perma.cc/62ZH-4SA8.
182. See, e.g., Tanja H., 228 Cal. App. 3d 434; The no duty rule announced in Tanja H. has been
adopted by numerous California courts, see, e.g., Nagash v. Bd. of Trs., 2016 WL 4056407 (Cal. 3d.
Dist. Ct. App. July 29, 2016), as well as courts in other jurisdictions, see, e.g., L.W. v. Westerns Golf
Ass’n, 675 N.E.2d 760 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); cf. Nero v. Kan. St. Univ., 861 P.2d 768 (1993) (finding
duty based on landlord tenant relationship); Stanton v. Univ. of Me., 773 A.2d 1045 (2001) (finding
college owed student duty of care based upon business invitee relationship).
183. Tanja H., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 438.
184. Id. at 438–39.
185. David G Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671, 1672–86 (2007)
(explaining duty, breach, causation and damages).
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1963); Nero, 861 P.2d at 780.
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When it comes to IHEs’ duty to engage in measures that seek to reduce
the risk of dorm-based sexual assaults, courts may choose to articulate
IHEs’ special duty to dorm residents in any number of ways.187 Whichever
special duty formulation is utilized, courts should begin by distinguishing
dorm-based sexual assaults involving stranger rapes188 and those involving
acquaintance rapes.189 Currently, most courts analyze both stranger and ac-
quaintance rapes under the special duty theories developed in premises lia-
bility cases, which look largely at prior similar instances in the vicinity of
the alleged assault.190 However, stranger and acquaintance assault claims
give rise to different considerations when assessing reasonable care and
foreseeability.191 For example, the known high rate of acquaintance assault
underreporting would be irrelevant in a stranger attack case but may come
into play in assessing foreseeability in a dorm-based acquaintance attack.
Broken building locks may demonstrate lack of reasonable care in a stran-
ger assault case but have no bearing on a school’s reasonable care in a
dorm-based acquaintance assault claim. Because peer-on-peer acquaintance
rapes raise different issues than stranger attacks, courts should look beyond
premises liability theories when assessing an IHE’s duty to dorm residents
who have allegedly been sexually assaulted by fellow students. The next
section outlines various duty formulations courts could employ.
2. Articulating a Special Duty
a. Existing Duty Analyses
Scholars, looking broadly at IHEs’ duty to their students, have devel-
oped various formulas. One suggestion is that a special duty exists between
187. See generally Brewer, supra note 97, at 389 (arguing that courts adopt the Restatement (Third) R
approach to school/student special duty); Kristen Peters, Note, Protecting the Millennial College Stu-
dent, 16 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 431, 465 (2007); see also ALIZA M. MILNER, CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY FOR INJURY INFLICTED ON STUDENT BY THIRD PARTY, 31 CAUSES OF
ACTION 2d 675 at § 7 (noting that courts have analyzed third-party assault claims against colleges using
a wide range of special duty formulations, including a duty based on custodian-charge, business-invitee,
landlord-tenant, and protector protectorate relationship).
188. See, e.g., Wheatley v. Marietta Coll., 48 N.E.3d 587 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016); Williams v. Utica
Coll. of Syracuse Univ., 453 F.3d 112 (2nd Cir. 2006); Lees v. Carthage Coll., 714 F.3d 516 (2013).
189. See, e.g., Facchetti, 175 F. Supp. 3d 627; Tanja H., 228 Cal. App. 3d 434; Stanton, 773 A.2d
1045.
190. Brewer, supra note 97, at 347. R
191. See, e.g., Lees, 714 F.3d at 523–26 (finding that in case where student was raped in her dorm by
a stranger, plaintiff’s expert inappropriately relied upon reports of dorm-based acquaintance rapes to
assess foreseeability, especially in light of the different measures necessary to prevent acquaintance rape
versus stranger rape); Williams, 453 F.3d at 118 (in suit alleging liability based on an attack by an
unidentified assailant, the court found that campus crime statistics and a security company’s warning
that the school needed to monitor an entrance raised issues of foreseeability for the jury to decide;
neither of those considerations would be relevant in an acquaintance assault case).
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IHEs and their students simply by virtue of the student/school relation-
ship.192 Another duty formulation, proposed by Professors Bickel and Lake,
suggests courts use a “facilitator” model—a model that sets out various
factors courts could use to balance a university’s responsibility to provide
guidance with student autonomy.193 The “millennial” model suggests courts
find that the college-student relationship gives rise to an affirmative duty to
act based on a student’s detrimental, reasonable reliance on a college’s act
that is tangentially related “to the college’s overall mission.”194 These duty
formulations account for the reality that today’s college freshmen do not
have the same level of maturity and judgment as adult tenants or adult busi-
ness invitees,195 and they also account for the fact that universities, as edu-
cational institutions, have some level of responsibility for guiding students
as they negotiate the path from teen to adult.
b. An Alternative Approach: Recognizing a Special Duty Based on
Superior Knowledge and Ability to Regulate Dorm Life
Any one of the above-suggested formulations for finding a duty would
be a viable basis for finding a duty to use reasonable care to reduce the risk
of dorm-based acquaintance assault. However, the above models create a
broad IHE/student duty. If courts sought a more limited duty articulation
applicable to cases of dorm-based acquaintance assault, courts could find a
special duty exists based upon IHEs’ superior knowledge of where most on-
campus assaults occur196 and their ability to regulate dorm life.197 This duty
formulation may make particular sense in light of the fact that many schools
require, or strongly recommend, that freshmen live in campus housing.198
192. Brewer, supra note 97. R
193. The factors include: (1) foreseeability of harm; (2) nature of the risk; (3) closeness of the
connection between the college’s act or omission, and student injury; (4) moral blame and responsibil-
ity; (5) the social policy of preventing future harm (whether finding duty will tend to prevent future
harm); (6) the burden on the university and the larger community if duty is recognized; and (7) the
availability of insurance. Robert D. Bickel & Peter F. Lake, The Emergence of New Paradigms in
Student-University Relations from “In Loco Parentis” To Bystander to Facilitator, 23 J.C. & U.L. 755,
789–92 (1997).
194. Peters, supra note 187, at 467. R
195. For an excellent overview of adolescent brain development and why adolescent decision mak-
ing differs from that of adults, see Michael N. Tennison & Amanda C. Pustilnick, “And if Your Friends
Jumped Off A Bridge, Would You Do It Too?”: How Developmental Neuroscience Can Inform Regimes
Governing Adolescents, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 533 (2015).
196. See supra infra Section V(C) (discussing colleges’ superior knowledge of where on-campus
sexual assaults occur).
197. See infra Section V(C) (discussing colleges’ ability to regulate various aspects of college dorms
and dormitory life).
198. Danielle Douglas Gabrielle, Freshmen Residency Rules Sometimes Force Students to Pay Pro-
hibitive Costs, WASH. POST (Sept. 29, 2015), https://perma.cc/6D66-V5TC (noting that at least 87 col-
leges require freshmen to live in on-campus housing).
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In other contexts, courts have found that a college’s superior knowl-
edge and control over the premises creates a special duty. For example, in
Furek v. University of Delaware,199 a fraternity hazing case, the Delaware
Supreme Court noted:
The university is not an insurer of the safety of its students nor a policeman of
student morality, nonetheless, it has a duty to regulate and supervise foresee-
able dangerous activities occurring on its property. That duty extends to the
negligent or intentional activities of third persons. Because of the extensive
freedom enjoyed by the modern university student, the duty of the university
to regulate and supervise should be limited to those instances where it exer-
cises control. Situations arising out of the ownership of land, within the con-
templation of Restatement § 344, involving student invitees present on the
property for the purposes permitted them are within such limitations.200
The court relied upon the reasoning in Mullins v. Pine Manor Col-
lege,201 a case involving a stranger attack and rape of a dorm student. In
Mullins, the Massachusetts Supreme Court articulated the idea that schools
often have superior knowledge of risks and also have control of the prem-
ises, and these two factors may serve as the basis for a special duty to use
reasonable care to protect students living in dorms against third-party
acts.202 As it noted:
“The concentration of young people, especially young women, on a college
campus, creates favorable opportunities for criminal behavior. The threat of
criminal acts of third parties to resident students is self-evident, and the col-
lege is the party which is in the position to take those steps which are neces-
sary to ensure the safety of its students.”203
Based upon the university’s superior knowledge and ability to control the
premises, the Mullins court found that the university had assumed a duty to
use reasonable care to protect its dorm residents against third-party criminal
acts.204
As Furek and Mullins demonstrate, articulating a special duty based
upon a university’s superior knowledge and control over the premises is not
without precedent. This conceptualization does not create a blanket special
199. 594 A.2d 506 (Del. 1991).
200. Furek, 594 A.2d at 522. Restatement of Torts § 344 (1934), upon which the Furek court relied,
states:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes is
subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the land for such a purpose,
for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third
persons or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to: (a)
discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or (b) give a warning adequate
to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to protect them against it.
201. 449 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1983).
202. Id. at 335–37.
203. Id. at 335.
204. Id.
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duty to protect students from injuries by third parties, something that courts
have thus far resisted.205 Instead, it focuses on a key policy reason for the
development of third-party liability—a recognition that when institutions
have superior knowledge of potential risks and have the ability to exercise
some level of control over those risks, imposing liability in those situations
“deter[s] entities from creating, ignoring, or disguising safety hazards.”206
In the final analysis, duty is a policy decision.207 When judges declare
that schools have no duty to address campus acquaintance sexual assaults,
they engage in policy decision-making that conflicts with legislative enact-
ments that indicate colleges do, in fact, owe their students a responsibility
when it comes to sexual violence awareness and prevention.208 Looking at
duty in light of long-standing institutional failures, expressed legislative
policy decisions, the data available to schools that is unlikely to be well-
known by students and parents,209 and schools’ ability to engage in reasona-
ble precautionary measures in the dorms they manage and control, illus-
trates how institutions have contributed to, and failed to address, a long-
standing problem that has significant social costs.210
C. Using Schools’ Superior Knowledge and Control Over the Premises
to Establish Duty and Standard of Care
This essay suggests that it is the combination of schools’ superior
knowledge and their ability to exercise regulatory authority over dormito-
ries that creates the special duty to dorm residents. Schools’ superior
knowledge of the risks of dorm-based assaults can be established through
numerous avenues such as: (1) a school’s own historical Clery Act reports,
which likely indicate the majority of their reported on-campus sexual as-
saults have occurred in their dorms; (2) the lack of easy accessibility and
comprehensibility of the school’s Clery Act reports by the general pub-
lic211; (3) national data that indicates that sexual violence victims often do
205. See MILNER, supra note 187, § 7.
206. Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No Duty Rules: Rape Victims and Comparative Fault, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1413, 1423 (1999) [hereinafter Bublick, Citizen No Duty Rules].
207. Mullins, 449 N.E. 2d at 335 (noting that “duty finds its “source in existing social values and
customs” and that schools’ duty to use reasonable care to protect students living in dorms against third-
party attacks is a duty that is “firmly embedded in a community consensus”).
208. See supra Section III(C)(1) (discussing Ramstad Amendment) and Section III(C)(2) (discussing
VAWA regulations).
209. See supra Section III(B) (discussing Clery Act and schools’ superior knowledge).
210. See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 176, at 446 (noting the costs to victims of campus sexual as- R
saults); see also supra text accompanying notes 177–184 (discussing the costs of campus sexual assaults
to victims and alleged perpetrators).
211. See supra Section III(B) (discussing why the public is unlikely to have equal access to, or
understanding of, the information in the Clery Act reports).
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not report,212 thus alerting schools to the fact that their own data likely
understates the problem in their dorms; and (4) other information poten-
tially in a school’s possession and not part of the current public information
domain.
In addition to schools’ superior knowledge, a duty arises because
schools have far-reaching control over dorms and dorm life. Schools decide
whether dorms are single-sex or co-ed; if co-ed, they decide if they are co-
ed by floor, hall, or room. Schools decide who lives in the dorms, e.g., they
may mandate that all freshmen must live in a school dorm, and they may
designate some dorms as “freshmen only.” Schools decide whom to hire as
resident assistants (RAs), how many RAs to hire, how to train them, and
how many to place in each dorm.
Schools also exercise substantial control when it comes to what infor-
mation dorm residents receive and how they receive it. Schools can dictate
what information may be posted and where it may be displayed. For exam-
ple, schools could post flyers on the back of every bathroom stall door with
basic facts about sexual assault risk factors, risk reduction methods, and
contact information for assault reporting. They could put up posters with
that information. Or, they could choose not to post anything. Schools could
mandate participation in dorm-based sexual assault risk reduction training
as a condition of living in the dorm. Schools also have the power to regulate
dorm-based alcohol consumption and overnight guests and can decide how
stringently to enforce those regulations. Unlike apartment managers or busi-
nesses, because of the unique relationship between schools and dorm re-
sidents, schools have significant regulatory control when it comes to dorm
life.
Establishing IHEs’ ability to regulate dorm life is not akin to arguing
schools exercise control over students. Thus, the court in Tanja H., which
used colleges’ presumed lack of control over students as a reason to find a
university owed its dorm resident student no duty to protect her against an
acquaintance’s brutal assault, went down the wrong analytical path. That
court reasoned that schools have no duty to students living in their dorms to
protect against acquaintance assaults because to do so would require unreal-
istic measures such as “24-hour guards” in each room and would “impose
onerous conditions on the freedom and privacy of resident students—which
restrictions are incompatible with a recognition that students are now gener-
ally responsible for their own actions and welfare.”213 The question is not
whether the school can control students but whether the school has control
over its own actions.
212. See supra Section III(A)(1) (discussing underreporting).
213. Tanja H., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 438.
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As Professor Bublick notes, “Although courts sometimes state that a
third-party defendant’s duty is to ‘protect the victim’ from rape, that state-
ment is inaccurate to the extent that it implies that the third party has a legal
obligation to ensure a particular outcome (strict liability) rather than to take
reasonable precautionary measures (to behave non-negligently.)”214 Leap-
ing to the conclusion that the duty to use reasonable care to protect against
dorm-based acquaintance assaults requires colleges to engage in expensive
and onerous restrictions on student freedom bypasses any true analysis
about what might constitute reasonable care. This kind of all-or-nothing
approach has significant analytical flaws. First, it obviates colleges’ respon-
sibility to engage in reasonable precautionary measures despite colleges’
superior knowledge about campus sexual assault risk factors, including
where most assaults occur, and despite the fact that as institutions of higher
learning, colleges are particularly well suited to develop meaningful educa-
tion programs that warn and inform about acquaintance assault risk avoid-
ance. Second, this reasoning creates a false tension between student and
university responsibility. It shifts all responsibility for student safety to
teenage students. It also ignores the fact that schools do engage in protec-
tive measures that seek to ensure student safety either outside the dorm or
from outsider attacks.215 Thus, schools create a situation in which students
may have a false sense of security once they enter the dorms despite the fact
that the dorms are likely the highest risk location for on-campus acquain-
tance assault.
Conceptualizing schools’ duty to students in their dorms as a special
relationship arising from schools’ superior knowledge and ability to regu-
late many aspects of dorm life does not mean courts will develop a standard
of care that requires schools to post 24-hour armed guards in dorms. What it
does mean is that courts should recognize that educational institutions
should not get a free pass for institutional failures to address serious risks
the institution knows to exist and to harm both victims and accused perpe-
trators.
Articulating a duty and standard of care as one requiring schools to
take reasonable precautionary measures comports with basic tort law princi-
ples that balance the foreseeability of the harm, the severity of the harm and
the cost/burden of protecting against or eliminating the harm based upon
public policy reasons.216 As one judge noted:
214. Bublick, Citizen No Duty Rules, supra note 206, at 1424. R
215. See supra Section (I)(B)(3)(a) (discussing how schools may be misleading students into think-
ing their dorms are a “safe space”).
216. This classic formulation was articulated by Judge Learned Hand in Carroll Towing Co., 159
F.2d 169 at 173.
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The magnitude of guarding against the risk and the consequences of placing
the burden on the university are low. Colleges inundate their students with a
vast amount of information regarding classes, housing, campus clubs and rec-
reation. They also inform students of the best ways to protect their rooms,
apartments, cars and bicycles from theft or vandalism. Surely a woman’s
physical and mental health deserve as much protection as her clock radio and
her hair dryer.217
What constitutes reasonable precautionary measures remains to be
seen, although there are some basic guidelines that should inform how col-
leges implement dorm-based assault risk reduction programs.218 Some col-
leges may point to the fact that they, along with many other schools, require
students to watch a training video, and they thus may argue that they have
met the standard of care when it comes to reasonable precautionary mea-
sures. However, this defense may prove inadequate given the literature that
suggests this educational and prevention methodology is largely ineffec-
tive.219 As Judge Learned Hand aptly noted, “courts must in the end say
what is required; there are precautions so imperative that even their univer-
sal disregard will not excuse their omission.”220 Plaintiffs’ lawyers and
courts likely will rely upon experts to help determine what schools should
be doing when it comes to engaging in reasonable risk reduction measures
in light of the risk of harm and the cost and feasibility of preventative mea-
sures.221 While tort litigation is not a panacea to the campus sexual assault
problem, it can help define meaningful awareness and risk reduction mea-
sures and incentivize schools to engage in those measures.222
217. Leonardi v. Bradley Univ., 625 N.E.2d 431, 438 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (Breslin, J., dissenting).
218. See, e.g., DeGue et al., supra note 62, at 356–58 (noting that research suggests that the princi-
ples of prevention that were strongly associated with positive effects when it comes to sexual violence
prevention had the following characteristics: (a) comprehensive, (b) appropriately timed, (c) utilized
varied teaching methods, (d) sufficient dosage, (e) administered by well-trained staff, (f) provided op-
portunities for positive relationships, (g) socio-culturally relevant, (h) theory-driven, and (i) included
outcome evaluation).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 123–125 (discussing why a one-time instructional video is
an ineffective risk reduction educational method).
220. The T.J. Hooper v. N. Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2nd Cir. 1932).
221. See, e.g., Lees, 714 F.3d at 523 (analogizing the standard of care in dorm-based assaults to the
standard of care in professional negligence claims and noting that “expert testimony is required to estab-
lish the standard of care for ensuring the security of a campus residential environment.”); see also, M.
Mozaffarieh & A. Wedrich, Malpractice in Ophthalmology: Guidelines for Preventing Pitfalls, 25 MED.
& L. 257, 258 (2006) (noting that “standards of care develop through a complex interaction within a
profession, between a profession and the public and between a profession and the legal system.”).
222. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 153 (2009) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (noting that “a
foundational premise of tort law-that liability for negligence, i.e., lack of due care, creates an incentive
to act with greater care.”); see also Amalea Smirniotopoulos, Bad Medicine: Prescription Drugs, Pre-
emption, and the Potential for a No-Fault Fix, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 793, 814 (2011)
(arguing “the threat of litigation incentivizes drug manufacturers to properly disclose pre-market and
post-market safety information by creating the threat of substantial monetary damages and reputational
costs in cases of misconduct.”).
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D. Re-framing Negligence Claims and Long-Term Risk Reduction Goals
Tort litigation raises numerous legal issues courts must grapple with.
Even if courts accept that schools have a duty to develop effective risk
reduction programs, tort litigation itself may not, at least initially, end in
plaintiff victories.223 Even if a plaintiff can overcome the duty and standard
of care hurdles, she still must prove causation224 and confront affirmative
defenses and apportionment issues that often generate a “blame the victim”
defense strategy.225 Additionally, with state universities, plaintiffs must ad-
dress potential sovereign immunity issues.226
However, tort claims do not have to be successful in order to change
institutional behaviors. Even when plaintiffs initially lose, filing the claims
can help frame the issue and change the narrative,227 paving the way for
eventual victories both in terms of lawsuits and self-regulatory policy
changes.228 Additionally, discovery may help disgorge information that fur-
ther points to institutional failures, again changing the narrative, helping
future plaintiffs, and leading to both self-regulatory changes and external
policy changes that address the underlying problem.229 “Although the civil
justice system is often valued only for its capacity to deter and to compen-
223. For a general discussion of hurdles that tort litigation sexual assault victims must overcome, see
Ellen M. Bublick, Tort Suits Filed By Rape and Sexual Assault Victims in Civil Courts: Lessons for
Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies, 59 SMU L. REV. 55, 76–78 (2006).
224. Id. at 92–94. Causation is generally a jury question so plaintiffs’ attorneys likely will be trying
to find the most convincing evidence that certain risk reduction methods are effective and meet the cost/
benefit test. To the extent plaintiffs’ attorneys become involved in this issue, they may help all schools
identify cost effective risk reduction methods.
225. Bublick, Citizen No Duty Rules, supra note 206, at 1433 (noting victims are blamed for not R
being constantly vigilant and self-protective).
226. Bublick, supra note 223, at 90 (noting that tort suits against public entities face state immunity R
defenses and that state actor immunity often depends upon “whether the public entity had purchased
liability insurance coverage, was grossly negligent, or had a special duty to protect the plaintiff”). But
see Nero, 861 P.2d at 782 (finding the discretionary function exception to the Kansas Tort Claims Act
did not immunize Kansas State University from a lawsuit in which a young woman alleged KSU failed
to use reasonable care to warn her and to use reasonable security measures to protect her against an
assault by a fellow student the university knew had previously assaulted another student).
227. LYTTON, supra note 17, at 13 (noting that clergy sexual abuse claims happened in three waves:
1984–1991, 1992–2001 and 2001–present). What may seem like common public knowledge about
church malfeasance today was not common knowledge just a few decades ago when incidents of clergy
sexual abuse were thought to be “rare and isolated occurrences” involving just a few bad priests. LYT-
TON, supra note 17.
228. See Lytton, supra note 143, at 1868–69 (discussing David Hunter’s arguments that claims do R
not have to be successful to be impactful).
229. See, e.g., LYTTON, supra note 17, at 137–60 (discussing the role of litigation in uncovering
concealed information in clergy sexual abuse litigation). See generally Erica Golger & Michael Halber-
stam, Litigation Discovery and Corporate Governance: The Missing Story About the “Genius” of Amer-
ican Corporate Law, 63 EMORY L.J. 1383 (2014) (discussing the role the discovery process plays in
producing information benefits to third parties, developing self-regulatory corporate governance struc-
tures, and providing information to external policymakers).
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sate, the power of the common-law courts also entails the ability to facili-
tate investigation.”230 Finally, the changed narrative and additional informa-
tion gathered as a result of civil litigation can also play a role in the devel-
opment of future regulations and create public pressure resulting in self-
regulation, as happened in clergy sexual abuse claims.231
VI. CONCLUSION
This essay highlights a problem known to colleges but not generally
known to the public: the fact that the majority of on-campus sexual assaults
occur in college dorm rooms. Many schools’ failure to forthrightly ac-
knowledge the problem that most on-campus assaults occur in dorm rooms,
and their concomitant failure to study this issue and potential dorm-based
risk reduction mechanisms, indicates a continued and ongoing reluctance to
acknowledge a long-standing problem. Litigation and enforcement actions
and the publicity they generate help expose institutional failures. This essay
suggests that negligence claims framing schools’ refusal to forthrightly ac-
knowledge and deal with what is happening in college dorm rooms as an
institutional failure may change judicial and public perceptions about IHEs’
silent complicity in a long-standing problem. That framing may generate
publicity and public pressure that motivates schools to address this aspect of
the campus sexual assault problem.
Schools, as educational institutions, are in a unique position to address
the problem of campus sexual assault risk reduction education, and in par-
ticular risk reduction in campus dorms. Whether they do so may depend, in
part, on courts’ willingness to force their hand.
230. Alex Kanner, The Evolving Jurisprudence of Toxic Torts: The Prognosis for Corporations, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1265, 1284 (1991).
231. LYTTON, supra note 17, at 108–36 (discussing how litigation helped make addressing clergy
sexual abuse a top priority within the Catholic church).
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